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 Joseph Stalin’s show trials, held in Moscow in the 1930s, are generally regarded by many 
historians primarily as a domestic policy move designed to remove opposition.  This is not the 
entire picture.  The trials need to be examined as part of a foreign policy maneuver designed by 
Stalin as a reaction to other world events occurring at the time, including the Great Depression, 
the Spanish Civil War, the rise of fascism in Germany nd Italy, and the threat of an increasingly 
militaristic Japan. 
 In analyzing the reactions of the West, including sources such as journalists and 
ambassadors, the individual trials of 1936, 1937, and 1938 can be more easily seen as part of 
Soviet foreign policy.  However, the increasing criti ism and lack of support from the West 
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THE STAGE AND THE COURTROOM:  JOSEPH STALIN’S MOSCOW TRIALS OF THE 
1930S AND THE CHARACTERIZATION OF A SHOW TRIAL 
 
The international situation in Europe in the 1930s involved a number of devastating 
events.  The Great Depression continued to destroy al eady weakened economies and 
unemployment rates kept rising.  Food shortages led to starvation and disease.  The Depression 
also helped give rise to paramilitary political groups that claimed they had the solution to the 
crisis.  The Fascists had taken power in the 1920s in Italy and Nazis followed suit in Germany.  
Each grew in strength and numbers, and consequently in aggressive tendencies against the 
international status quo.  From 1936 to 1939, the Spanish Civil War was one reflection of the 
threat of Fascism to Europe and possibly the rest of the world.  To protect themselves, many 
nations attempted military and economic negotiations with each other.  France, Great Britain, 
Poland, and others pursued what they felt was the best possible course of action against any 
threats to their borders.  In the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin employed show trials as part of a 
strategy to enlist international sympathy and opposition to Germany. 
Events within each of these nations, however, weakened the desire for international 
cooperation and helped enhance the chaos and uncertai ty in Europe at the time.  By 1936, 
Popular Front governments, especially in France, were crumbling as the devastated political 
parties and the economy faced continued mass strike and protests.  In the Soviet Union, Stalin’s 
policies of collectivization and industrialization were underway, as was what would become 
known as the Great Terror.  The most prominent characte istic of the Terror was Stalin’s famous 
show trials, held from 1936 to 1938.  Despite Stalin’s goal of wanting the Soviet Union to appear 
as a bulwark against fascism, the indictment and execution of many high ranking Communist 
Party officials made many nations question what the Soviet Union had to offer to the cause of 
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anti-fascism and international stability.  Joseph Stalin’s show trials ultimately failed to convince 
a Western audience that the Soviet Union was genuinly capable of fending off fascist 
aggression, mainly because of the continually worsening international situation in Europe in the 
1930s. 
The trial has always been a significant historical phenomenon.  Whether legitimate or 
staged, the charges alone can be telling evidence of th  current state of both domestic and 
international affairs of the time.  An oppressive ruling power can use judicial process to maintain 
order through law and fear, and a trial sends the message that criticism will not be tolerated.  At 
the same time, a trial can also bring to light the paranoia, irrationality, and fear of the same ruling 
power.  Fear of overthrow could lead to arrests and trials for even the simplest of offenses, and at 
times many of the charges are created out of thin air, as in the case of the Soviet Union under 
Stalin.  Reactions to trials are also important to analyze.  They not only can detail an observer or 
follower of the trial’s thoughts on the charges and verdicts, but also can show both domestic and 
foreign assessment of the ruling government.  The typ of reactions provided by observers can 
tell a researcher or historian not only how outsiders viewed the trials themselves, but also can 
give at the very least a rudimentary picture of the state of politics, society, and economy in other 
nations around the world.  Trials are never just trials—they always fit into an analysis of any 
period in history and allow for a more robust picture of the time in which they occur. 
 Stalin’s trials have been widely understood to be “show trials”, so it is necessary to create 
a definition for this in order to better analyze audience reaction and trial procedure.  In a 1971 
article, Ronald Sokol presents different types of trials in an attempt to determine the definition of 
a political trial.  However, some of the suggestions can very much apply to a show trial, 
especially as show trials are frequently political n nature.  According to Sokol, one type of trial 
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is “brought about because the state mistakenly believ s itself in jeopardy or deliberately strives 
to simulate jeopardy for political advantage.”1 This definition identifies the state as the creator of 
the courtroom drama, but past trials have also involved the church, political parties, or even 
specific individuals attempting to gain advantages that are not necessarily political. 
 In addition to this, a show trial typically involves those on trial facing overwhelming 
odds.  The prosecutors seem to have an endless number of severe charges and damaging 
evidence that is difficult to prove or disprove.  An excellent example of this is seen in the trial of 
Jacques Pierre Brissot and other fellow members of the Girondins in 1793 in France.2  The 
Jacobins led the revolutionary tribunal whose “indictment reviewed the history of the 
Revolution” and involved multiple plots, including “an attempt to deliver France to the Prussians 
in the summer of 1792:  discord was to be created by the encouragement of financial speculation 
and the hoarding of food…”3 The group also allegedly worked to prevent Louis XVI’s execution 
while plotting to assassinate republicans.  Charges continued to pile up as accusations of 
federalism, royalism, and warmongering surfaced. 
 One can see the use of such procedure even as far back as the Inquisition.  While the 
inquisitors’ proclaimed goal was to eradicate heresy, this was not an easy charge to prove.  Many 
judges already presumed guilt in advance, and “human frailty, resolved to accomplish a 
predetermined end, inevitably reached the practical conclusion that the sacrifice of a hundred 
                                                
1 Ronald Sokol, “The Political Trial:  Courtroom as Stage, History as Critic,” New Literary History, Vol. 2, 
No. 3, Spring 1971, p. 497. 
2 Trials during the French Revolution turned out to be important to the Bolsheviks when they began holding 
their own in the early twentieth century.  Like the Jacobins in France, the creation of a tribunal was an attempt by 
the Bolsheviks to convince the world of their legitimacy and to justify the takeover of power.  Adele Lindenmeyr, in 
a 2001 article, points out that the tribunal was “composed of ordinary workers and soldiers in conscious mitation of 
the French Revolution” (“The First Soviet Political Trial:  Countess Sofia Panina before the Petrograd Revolutionary 
Tribunal,” Russian Review, Vol. 60, No. 4, October 2001, p. 505).  Julie Cassiday notes that the tribunals “were both 
conceived and perceived as Soviet renditions of the highly theatrical public trials of the French Revolution” 
(“Marble Columns and Jupiter Lights:  Theatrical and Cinematic Modeling of Soviet Show Trials in the 1920s,” The 
Slavic and East European Journal, Vol. 42, No. 4, Winter 1998, p. 644). 
3 M. J. Sydenham, The Girondins (Westport:  Greenwood Press, 1961), p. 26. 
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innocent men were better than the escape of one guilty.” 4 The Inquisition also helps explain 
another key aspect of a show trial:  the change in procedure over time to fit with current social or 
political trends in order to reach desired results. 
 In Italy, court methods changed as education increased among the populace.  Knowledge 
of the charges against defendants became more widespread and an understanding of both church 
and secular laws forced courts to alter procedure.  Eventually, “to avert the misfortune of 
acquitting those who could not be brought to confess, it became necessary to invent a new 
crime—that known as ‘suspicion of heresy’.”5 As church and secular courts worked to more 
efficiently charge alleged sinners and lawbreakers with crimes, definitions of charges also had to 
change.  An excellent example of this is with the witchcraft trial of Giovanna Bonnano in Italy.  
As Roman law became more prevalent and courts more frequently referred to science and 
medicine, “in using a theater of grand punitive exemplum, the goal was to ‘modernize’ the 
habitus of the governed, who would be pressed toward skepticism regarding magic and a greater 
individualism.”6 Courts were beginning to gather evidence based on scie tific fact rather than a 
belief in magic and the supernatural.  Modernization and knowledge, however, not only changed 
definitions, but also led to different methods of gaining confessions. 
 Staged trials can clearly not work without desired confession from defendants and even 
testimony from witnesses.  For the prosecution to send its intended message, it is necessary for 
the “guilty” to proclaim their own guilt.  Such a confession proves that the state/church is correct 
and thus justified in its methods of interrogation and judicial process.  A successful show trial 
                                                
4 Henry Charles Lea, The Inquisition of the Middle Ages (New York:  The Citadel Press, 1954), p. 97. 
5 Henry Charles Lea, The Inquisition of the Middle Ages, p. 129. 
6 Giovanna Fiume, “The Old Vinegar Lady, or the Judicial Modernization of the Crime of Witchcraft,” 
History From Crime, Edward Muir and Guido Ruggerio, eds. (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p 
81. 
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must involve self-incrimination, which should lead the audience to believe in the power of the 
state and its desire to protect its citizens.   
Because a confession was necessary, courts had to become creative in their methods of 
obtaining one.  In the Middle Ages “curial hesitation to exacerbate the conflict with secular 
authorities who were…accusing the Holy Office of softness in the prosecution of witchcraft…” 
made the church less willing to integrate secular court procedure into their own methods, but 
eventually this did happen, and at the same time secular courts borrowed much from the 
inquisitorial process.7 Because of this, new methods of interrogation through torture and deceit 
became prevalent.  Often, prisoners who refused to confess found themselves in extended 
solitary confinement with little hope of reprieve.  Why, then, keep so many people locked up 
when “torture saved the trouble and expense of prolonged imprisonment”?8  
While it was never officially confirmed whether Joseph Stalin had the main defendants of 
the Moscow trials tortured, many interrogations in the 1930s did involve threats on individuals 
and their families combined with confinement.  One major argument among the trial observers 
and reporters was how defendants looked and sounded wh n they gave their testimony, and 
opinion on this was split.  Audience reaction and opinion, however, remains the most important 
aspect of a trial if it is to be deemed a show trial. 
 To put on a show trial that never sends a message to a specific audience means that the 
centralized authority failed.  Some degree of popular support is always necessary to gain and 
maintain power.  More modern trials had the benefit of methods of mass communication, but 
earlier trials had to use other means to gain publicity.  In the previously mentioned Italian 
witchcraft trial, the court kept bringing in more and more people.  This “seemed to create 
                                                
7 John Tedeschi, The Prosecution of Heresy:  Collected Studies on the Inquisition in Early Modern Italy 
(New York:  Medieval & Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1991), p. 211. 
8 Henry Charles Lea, The Inquisition of the Middle Ages, p. 112. 
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virtually a modern maxi-trial in which the number of defendants and witnesses made up for the 
lack of modern means of mass communication to provide the maximum publicity.”9 Trials in 
Revolutionary France usually had accompanying pamphlets that recounted all the events and 
circulated among the population.  This also helped cr ate a strong network of word-of-mouth 
communication.  Many of the pamphlets contained doctored stories that portrayed the defendants 
as dangerous villains—even more dangerous than the courts proclaimed them to be. 
 The Soviet Union had state-run media outlets in Pravda and Izvestia, and these frequently 
ended up as the only way citizens heard of the trials aside from word of mouth.  However, with 
the international situation as it was in the 1930s—the German threat, Great Depression, and 
Spanish Civil War most noticeably—Stalin needed a foreign audience as well.  This proved to be 
a double-edged sword, as free presses and multi-party olitics in the West provided both 
opposition to and praise for the trials. 
Even before Lenin’s death at the beginning of 1924, Stalin had been gaining a significant 
amount of power.  The important positions he held st him up so that “two years after the end of 
the civil war Russian society already lived under Stalin’s virtual rule.”10 He was Commissar of 
Nationalities that oversaw border territories and formed a large support network for his rise to 
the head of the Soviet Union.  As Commissar of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate 
beginning in 1919 his task was to eliminate “inefficiency and corruption, which the Soviet civil 
service had inherited from its Tsarist predecessor.”11 Such was a foreshadowing of the plans 
Stalin carried out in future years.  In 1922, with Lenin’s sponsorship, Stalin became General 
Secretary, a position that would organize the work of all government offices.  Shortly after, 
Lenin suffered his first stroke.  Two more would follow, and during this time Lenin composed 
                                                
9 Giovanna Fiume, “The Old Vinegar Lady,” p. 81. 
10 Isaac Deutscher, Stalin:  A Political Biography (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 228. 
11 Isaac Deutscher, Stalin:  A Political Biography, p. 230. 
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his will and testament, and a power struggle began, ending years after Lenin’s death on January 
21, 1924. 
 The division in government that followed allowed Stalin to gain power by playing each 
side off the other.  The Left favored “accelerated industrialization at home and active 
encouragement abroad” for revolution while the Right believed in a more moderate and balanced 
growth of industry and the “gradual building of a socialism based on peasant cooperatives, and 
stood for caution in international affairs.”12 The split over world revolution versus socialist 
revolution in the Soviet Union first remained a key issue, and in the midst of this, Leon Trotsky 
maintained the position that Stalin played both side , adopting both Left and Right ideas in order 
to maneuver himself into power.13 
 The possibility of Trotsky taking Lenin’s position unsurprisingly did not sit well with 
Stalin.  With support from Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, he criticized Trotsky’s views, 
primarily his belief in aggressive international socialist revolution, and “the very name of 
Trotsky’s theory, ‘permanent revolution’, sounded like an ominous warning to a tired generation 
that it should expect no Peace and Quiet in its lifetime.”14 Stalin played on public fears of 
continual violence and instability to discredit Trotsky.  He appointed his closest colleagues into 
positions of power, allowing for the construction of a vast information network.  By the end of 
the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, Stalin maaged to justify using police force against 
                                                
12 Robert Tucker, Stalin in Power:  The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (New York:  W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1990), p. 39.  Tucker argues that such arguments were only natural, despite Lenin’s speeches and beliefs.  
Bolsheviks, much like politicians in America today, each determined which of Lenin’s ideas should be stres ed or 
minimized.  Lenin’s death only served to enhance the conflicting policy goals of the Party. 
13 Lenin held the belief that revolution in the Soviet Union could not happen without parallel revolutions in 
other countries.  For Lenin, revolution was always necessary.  The only way to remove oppression was through 
revolutionary upheaval, which is why he was an outspoken supporter of world revolution.  See Louis Fischer’s The 
Life of Lenin (New York:  Harper & Row, 1964), p. 47. 
14 Isaac Deutscher, Stalin:  A Political Biography, p. 291. 
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other Bolsheviks, claiming the Left had turned into an anti-Soviet organization.15 While Trotsky 
had already been in internal exile by 1929, Stalin co vinced the Politburo to deport him, and they 
sent Trotsky to Turkey, effectively weakening his power and allowing Stalin to begin carrying 
out his plans for the country. 
 Stalin, like other Bolshevik leaders, ultimately wished to convert the Soviet Union into an 
efficient socialist state.  He held three important views on how to do so: 
First, the engine of change could and should be the revolutionary use of state 
power…Second, the prime purpose of this revolutionary use of state power was the 
augmentation of state power…Third, because it was necessary to prepare quickly for a 
coming war, it was imperative to accomplish all these transformations at a maximally 
swift tempo.16 
 
Thus Stalin began policies of collectivization and i ustrialization. 
 By instituting what he called the First Five-Year Plan in 1928, Stalin hoped to rapidly 
build up Soviet industry in order to augment the defense of the nation and to more effectively 
increase grain output using new technologies.  He knew he needed help from the West in 
learning to construct and employ all the new methods he hoped to gain.  A policy of 
collectivization immediately followed, and the goal was to convert all the individual farmland in 
the countryside to collective farms, which would according to Stalin make for a more efficient 
production and export system for grain harvests.  The problem was that after the Civil War, 
many peasants and kulaks (the richer of peasants) supported the New Economic Policy that gave 
them new farming techniques and brought in more money.17  It was in very few peasants’ 
                                                
15 Robert Tucker, Stalin in Power, p. 126. 
16 Robert Tucker, Stalin in Power, p. 45.  Tucker uses the word “war” to indicate a fight against capitalist 
encirclement, not against a specific nation. 
17 Most of the time, authorities had no idea who were kulaks or middle peasants because of the moderate 
economic prosperity enjoyed by the peasantry in the villages.  They all helped each other out and because of this 
there was even more resistance to collectivization in the thriving villages.  See Robert Conquest’s Stalin:  Breaker of 
Nations (New York:  Penguin Books, 1991).  By 1937, the peasantry, much like the workers, already had experience 
with show trials.  Many peasants on collective farms complained, with good reason, about the deplorable use of 
power authorities showed.  Stalin, in an attempt to gain support from the peasantry, put Party officials into a 
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interest to give up land and grain and many resisted collectivization.  As a result, rather than 
relinquish livestock and grain, peasants slaughtered th ir animals and hid grain, which led to 
mass famine and millions of deaths.  By the end of the First Five-Year Plan, cities had grown and 
industrialization was slowly gaining momentum, but the countryside was devastated.  Despite 
this, Stalin called for a Second Five-Year Plan in 1932.18 
 Opposition to Stalin began to grow by this time, especially over the methods of grain 
requisition.  Nikolai Bukharin, with support from Zinoviev and Kamenev, argued for allowing 
the peasantry to become more prosperous on their own, leading to cooperation with a 
government that wanted to help them do so.  Stalin ma aged to expel Bukharin from the 
Politburo by 1929, and despite the failure of collectivization, “Stalin’s defeat in the countryside 
was accompanied by final victory in the Politburo.”19 In his speeches he declared that plans were 
successful, and there were only a few areas were opposition seemed to be ruining the pace of 
collectivization.  He began removing opposition lead rs from their posts, including Bukharin, 
Zinoviev, and Kamenev, in order to maintain the illusion of a successful campaign.  This, 
however, could not silence the criticisms. 
 In January 1934, the Seventeenth Party Congress convened in Moscow, and the voting 
showed that Stalin was not as popular as other Bolshevik leaders.  Sergei Kirov, an Old 
                                                                                                                                                
courtroom setting where most of the evidence against them came only from peasant witnesses.  Sheila Fitzpatrick 
argues that the peasants, while using the system to rem ve officials, continued to be wary of Stalin’s plans (“How 
the Mice Buried the Cat:  Scenes from the Great Purges of 1937 in the Russian Provinces,” Russian Review, Vol. 52, 
No. 3, July 1993, pp. 299-320).  Michael Ellman, however, disagrees, pointing out that many peasants supported this 
method of removing poor authority.  The trials were not just “carnival”, but part of the Terror as orde ed by Stalin 
himself (“The Soviet 1937 Provincial Show Trials:  Carnival or Terror?” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 8, 
December 2001, pp. 1221-1233). 
18 The First Five-Year Plan, beginning in 1929, actually showed slight increase in grain exports but a 
drastic 65 percent decline in the export of any other farm products, which showed that the industrial part of the Plan 
was not exactly strengthened by the agricultural side.  The slaughter of livestock to prevent requisition by the Party 
showed itself in every area of the Soviet Union, especially outlying territories, where death and famine reduced 
livestock population by roughly 80 to 90 percent.  By 1937 an estimated—and still contested—11 million human 
deaths from dekulakization and famine occurred.  Figures taken from Robert Conquest’s The Harvest of Sorrow:  
Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1986). 
19 Robert Conquest, Stalin:  Breaker of Nations, p. 160. 
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Bolshevik who had participated in the 1905 and 1917 Revolutions and the Civil War, was a 
celebrated figure in the Party.  After his success at the Congress he represented the opposition to 
Stalin in the Politburo until he was killed in December 1934.  The circumstances of his death 
remain unclear but it is extremely likely Stalin had  hand in the murder.20  Kirov’s death 
signaled not only an end to coordinated opposition against Stalin, but also the beginning of what 
would be the deaths of millions across the Soviet Union, the Great Terror.  Stalin’s system for 
the removal of opponents involved constant surveillance of the population, mass imprisonment, 
and executions.  While many Soviet citizens never really understood what was happening they 
knew enough not to speak out against Stalin and the gov rnment, and thus fear became the most 
effective tool of the Terror. The most prominent characteristic of the Terror was the trial.  In the 
countryside, anyone could point out the existence of t rrorists and traitors who wanted to destroy 
the system Stalin set up, and trials most often led to guilty verdicts.  In Moscow, however, from 
1936-1938, Stalin held three of the most important rials, each one leading to the arrest and 
removal of many high-level Party officials. 
It is necessary to explain the three major trials, the key defendants, and the charges 
brought against them in order to understand the magnitude of Stalin’s plans.  The first of the 
Moscow trials occurred from August 19 to 24 in 1936.  While the list of defendants included 
sixteen men, there were three major players.  The first, Grigory Zinoviev, was a prominent figure 
in the Communist Party Central Committee, especially during Lenin’s last years.  After a failed 
attempt to seize power from Stalin in 1925, he was expelled from the Party in 1927 and exiled 
until he publicly acknowledged his mistakes.  He was reinstated to the Party, but by December 
                                                
20 Historians often debate just how directly Stalin became involved with Kirov’s murder.  Robert Tucker 
questions the idea that Stalin ever met the murdere, Nikolaev, in person.  It is more likely that Stalin used someone 
else to gain Nikolaev’s support.  See Stalin in Power, p. 290.  Adam Ulam points out how foolish it would have 
been for such a man as Stalin to ever have left a paper trail over this incident, but clearly Stalin had the most to gain 
from Kirov’s death.  See Stalin:  The Man and His Era (New York:  Viking Press, 1973), p. 382. 
 11
1934, after the murder of Sergei Kirov, Zinoviev was again expelled and this time arrested.  In 
1935 a short trial showed him guilty of having a hand in the death.  By the time the 1936 trial 
began, Zinoviev was in the middle of serving a ten-y ar prison sentence as a result of the past 
events. 
 Lev Kamenev, the second high-profile defendant, became the primary speaker for an 
alliance known as the United Opposition which publicly opposed Stalin’s control in the 1920s.  
After a Party Congress deemed his ideas incompatible with the Party line, the CPSU expelled 
him until he admitted his mistakes.  Kamenev faced th  same charges as Zinoviev in 1935, and 
when put on trial in 1936 he, too, was currently serving time for implication in Kirov’s 
assassination. 
 Ivan Smirnov served a significant role in the economic affairs of the Soviet Union and 
was also a member of the Executive Committee of the CPSU in the 1920s.  By 1925, however, 
Smirnov became an outspoken proponent of the idea that Stalin needed to be removed from his 
post as Secretary General.  He soon was removed from his posts and exiled until he broke with 
Trotsky.  Upon reinstatement to the Party, he took a post in the heavy industry field until 1933 
when he was again expelled and put into a labor camp, where he remained until brought to trial 
in 1936. 
 The men on trial in August 1936 faced a variety of charges, including those of wrecking, 
sabotage, and terrorist activities.  The term “terrorism” in the 1930s usually meant assassination 
attempts and the desire to harm or injure specific targets, which in this case were figures such as 
Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, and, most noticeably, Kirov.  The trial attempted to show that the 
conspiracies were very complex and involved a large number of agents from many different 
fields.  While Zinoviev and Kamenev were said to have led the plot, they had help from such 
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men as Isak Reingold, who worked in the Commissariat of Agriculture and Vagarshak Ter-
Vaganyan, the Armenian Communist Party leader.  Through sabotage of industry and agriculture 
and with the help of foreign agents, primarily Nazi Party members, Leon Trotsky seemed to be 
orchestrating an overthrow of Stalin’s regime from exile.  In the end, the court found all sixteen 
men, or the “Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre”, guilty and sentenced every one of them to 
death.21 
 Less than a year later, the second Moscow trial took place during the week of January 23-
30, 1937.  With Zinoviev out of the picture, the seventeen men this time formed the “Anti-Soviet 
Trotskyite Center” against Stalin’s government.  They stood “accused of treason against the 
country, espionage, acts of diversion, wrecking activities and the preparation of terrorist acts.”22 
For this trial, there were two major figures:  Karl Radek and Yuri Pyatakov. 
 Karl Radek joined the Bolsheviks after the 1917 Revolution, but supported them through 
the First World War.  He spent a great deal of time n Germany working to gain supporters for 
Communism and contacts for the CPSU.  Radek was a member of the Central Committee and 
then joined the Comintern during the early 1920s, and contributed to the Soviet Constitution in 
1936 that much of the Western world hailed as a large step toward the democratization of the 
Soviet Union.  Because of his posts which allowed him a great deal of contact with the West, he 
had a large number of friends among Western journalists and political figures, which helped 
make the 1937 trial slightly higher profile than its predecessor. 
                                                
21 Much of the defendants’ titles and backgrounds is listed in John Dewey’s report Not Guilty:  Report of 
the Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials (New York:  Harper 
& Brothers, 1938).  Robert Conquest’s The Great Terror:  A Reassessment (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1990) also provides more detailed backgrounds of defen ants such as Zinoviev and Kamenev and will be used 
accordingly in the following chapters. 
22 People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-
Soviet Trotskyite Center (New York:  Howard Fertig, 1967), Cover.  Originally printed in Moscow after the trial in 
1937, the English translation came out thirty years after the fact. 
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 Yuri Pyatakov was a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist 
Party.  In the 1920s he took over a position in the Soviet Economic Council and oversaw the coal 
industry in a number of regions in the country.  Hefrequently aligned himself with Trotsky’s 
ideas and after expulsion and reinstatement into the Party, he took over a post in the heavy 
industry sector.  His past pro-Trotsky views earned him a trip to the courtroom in 1937 where he 
confessed to conspiring with Nazi agents to gain control of the Soviet Union. 
 While the charges were much the same in 1937 as they had been the year before, this 
time there was slightly more emphasis placed on the help of foreign agents as well as the 
sabotage of industry.  Three of the defendants, Yosif Turok, Yakov Livshitz, and Ivan Knayazev, 
worked closely overseeing railroad construction and maintenance.  Leonid Serebryakov and 
Stanislav Ratachaik had posts in the industrial sector, while Grigori Sokolnikov had been both 
Commissar of Finance and an ambassador to England.  Fortunately for Stalin, the Soviet Union 
and Communist Party had such a wide number of posts and jobs that someone could always be 
held accountable for problems.  In the end, Mikhail Stroilov received eight years in prison and 
Valentin Arnold, Sokolnikov, and Radek each escaped with ten years.  The court decided on the 
death sentence for the other thirteen men.23 
 The final trial held from March 2-13 in 1938 was arguably the most widely publicized, 
and the “Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites” faced similar charges as the men in the 
previous two trials.  One of the reasons that this trial was so significant was because of its 
primary defendant, Nikolai Bukharin.  Bukharin was editor of both Pravda and later Izvestia, the 
state-run media outlets of the Soviet Union.  He argued for the continuation of war efforts in 
                                                
23 The official description of the charges was printed in Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the 
Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center (People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1937), Cover, and stated the 
defendants stood “accused of treason against the country, espionage, acts of diversion, wrecking activities and the 
preparation of terrorist acts.” Trials such as these could only occur with vague and generalized charges. 
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1917 rather than the cessation of hostilities through the meeting at Brest-Litovsk.  He was a 
major supporter of the New Economic Policy, and he favored a more moderately paced 
industrialization than Stalin planned.  Bukharin was also the primary mind behind the Soviet 
Constitution of 1936.  Stalin eventually used Bukharin’s meetings with Zinoviev and Kamenev 
and his more moderate views on industrialization as the reason for putting the so-called traitor in 
prison. 
 The 1938 trial involved again a number of defendants who allegedly participated in 
wrecking and sabotage, but this time around the largest percentage of the men were accused of 
spying for foreign powers.  Kristian Rakovsky and Arkady Rosengoltz claimed to be working for 
both Germany and Great Britain as defendants had in 1936 and 1937.  This time, however, other 
nations allegedly played a bigger hand in the attemp d overthrow of the Soviet regime.  Grigori 
Grinko and Vasili Sharangovich supposedly collaborated with Poland, and Rakovsky and 
Rosengoltz wrecked industry to help Japan.  It was clear by 1938 that the theme was the threat of 
war.  Akmal Ikramov and Faizulla Khodjayev worked to weaken Uzbekistan for attack, while 
Sharangovich did the same in Byelorussia.  While Sergei Bessonov received fifteen years in 
prison, Rakovsky faced twenty and Dmitrii Pletnev lft with twenty-five.  The rest of the 
defendants, including Bukharin, could only sit and listen as the court passed down the death 
sentence on each of them.24 
 Stalin had to be well aware of the history and evoluti n of trials in Russia, especially as 
much of the show trial process had roots in the pre-Revolutionary era.25  The Russian Orthodox 
                                                
24 A more detailed list of defendants is provided in later chapters and is taken from both Not Guilty and the 
Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet ‘Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites’ (People’s Commissariat 
of Justice of the USSR, 1938). 
25 Stalin learned much of the process of a show trial from his predecessor Lenin, who in turn borrowed 
from history.  In the 1910s and 1920s, “…Lenin and his colleagues used the law as a tool for implementing their 
policies.  This approach to law was consistent with the autocratic tradition of the tsars and had roots in he ideas and 
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Church had been searching out and dealing with sinners for hundreds of years, and Alexander II 
introduced the concept of a jury trial in 1864.  Bythe early twentieth century, anti-tsarist 
sentiment led to the creation and rise of what would be known as agitation trials.  These trials 
actually were plays that took place in local theaters and clubs, and the writers designed them not 
only as a means of speaking out against social ills, but also as a way to distance themselves from 
the decaying tsarist authority.  After the revolutions in 1905 and 1917, an agitation trial was one 
of the many ways in which people could distance themselves from the backwardness of the old 
order.  As they grew in popularity, “the trials thus proved to be a crucial venue for the 
intersection of the Enlightenment ideals of tsarist-era educators, the anxieties and insecurity of 
early Soviet administrators, and the general population’s hunger for drama.”26 By 1864, Russians 
loved trials, especially when it was someone else facing the charges. 
 Agitation trials took full advantage of audience participation and reaction.  At the end of 
the play, the crowd was often allowed to decide the fat  of the defendants, and for observers this 
was the most entertaining part.  They listened to the play word for word so they could fully 
understand the charges and act according to their own knowledge.  Eventually, however, by the 
1920s and 1930s, the trials had evolved into more than just entertainment.  With the struggle to 
build a powerful centralized Bolshevik authority, the audience eventually learned that they were 
meant to change their lives according to the lessons of the agitation trials.  The last of the 
agitation trials “reflect[ed] the temper of the times.  They open with long disquisitions on 
socialist construction and industrialization” as well as with reports on the conditions of grain 
                                                                                                                                                
assumptions of Russian Marxism as well.” See Peter Solomon, Jr., Soviet Criminal Justice Under Stalin (London:  
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 17. 
26 Elizabeth Wood, Performing Justice:  Agitation Trials in Early Soviet Russia (Ithaca:  Cornell University 
Press, 2005), p. 14. 
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supplies and agriculture across Russia.27 The Bolsheviks needed to get messages across, and by 
the 1920s the agitation trials had changed from a form of entertainment to Bolshevik propaganda 
and an increased ability to reach a greater number of people.  From Lenin’s major trials in the 
1920s to Stalin’s in the 1930s, the show trials were “a version of the agitation trial on a larger 
scale.”28 
Much of Stalin’s trials in the 1930s took lessons not only from the agitation trials of the 
early Soviet era, but also from the Soviet trials of the 1920s under Lenin, trials that easily fall 
into the category of show trials.  Julie Cassiday discusses the evolution of the courtroom and 
procedures from Lenin to Stalin and explains why the transition occurred.  For Cassiday, the 
most important changes came about because of the increased use and control of the theatrical and 
cinematic means of representation in the courtroom.  She argues that Soviet trials, in fact, 
borrowed from the French Revolutionary model that allowed for the incorporation of “spectator 
participation and the elimination of the boundary between the audience and the stage.”29 Pictures 
from the Soviet trials suggest a crowd that seemed ore like there was a play rather than a trial 
taking place in front of it.  Audience reaction became so important that 
court officials and defendants alike tried to build sympathy in the    trial’s 
audience by casting themselves in the role of the romantic 
revolutionary…The need for correct expression of audience 
participation…proved so great that GPU agents even sat among the trial’s 
spectators to provoke appropriate responses…30 
 
 The trial of the Social Revolutionaries in 1922 under Lenin allowed defendants to speak 
out, but the 1928 Shakhty trial ended that.31  Stalin had the benefit of historical trials, plus the 
                                                
27 Elizabeth Wood, Performing Justice, p. 201. 
28 Elizabeth Wood, Performing Justice, p. 195. 
29 Julie Cassiday, “Marble Columns and Jupiter Lights,” p. 644. 
30 Julie Cassiday, “Marble Columns and Jupiter Lights,” p. 645. 
31 The Trial of the SRs began June 8, 1922.  The SR Party initially fought against the Bolsheviks in the 
Russian Civil War, but realized the White armies planned to restore the tsarist regime and consequently ended 
warfare with Lenin.  After the Bolsheviks granted them amnesty in 1919, by April 1922 the SRs went to trial 
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knowledge of Lenin’s trials.  Increased audience participation combined with a story-like plot 
created by defendants’ testimony, and because of this “by the end of the 1930s, Soviet statecraft 
had become Soviet stagecraft.”32 
 Looking back at various trials, it is clear that Joseph Stalin did not pull his ideas out of 
thin air.  Rather, he used a mix of history and social issues.  He borrowed elements of trials from 
as far back as the Inquisition and witchcraft trials nd gained the outlines for audience 
participation from the French Revolution.  The agittion trials of early twentieth century Russia 
provided blueprints for the theatrical process of ashow trial, and Lenin in the 1920s proved that 
one could successfully integrate Bolshevik propaganda and audience participation to create an 
effective way to gain popular support and remove opposition to power. 
 The following chapters will examine Stalin’s three major show trials, each placed in the 
context of the events occurring in Europe, Asia, and the United States.  Reactions to the trials 
hold the most important key to the success or failure of Stalin’s attempts at improving relations 
with the West, and as such each chapter determines the nature of change in reaction over the 
course of the trials.  Chapter two focuses on the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial in 1936 and uses 
journalistic and government reaction to fully portray the uncertainty of the West over Stalin’s 
intentions for holding such a trial. 
                                                                                                                                                
anyway.  Despite attempts by Lenin’s party to curry favor with workers and gain support for the trial, few showed 
up at demonstrations.  Among the prominent figures at the trial were Karl Radek, Yuri Pyatakov, and Nikolai 
Bukharin, who would later sit on the other side of the defendant stand.  On August 7, 1922, the court handed down 
death sentences on the defendants, but realizing both the peasant and international support he would lose, Lenin 
simply held the men in prison.  Only in 1936 did the survivors meet their ends at the hands of Joseph Stalin.  See 
David Shub’s article “The Trial of the SRs” (Russian Review, Vol. 23, No. 4 October 1964, pp. 362-369).  On May 
18, 1928, the Shakhty Trial began, and the fifty-three defendants were all coal-mining engineers, some of whom 
were German.  In the middle of the First Five Year Plan, Stalin needed scapegoats to explain poor producti n levels 
and low output results.  By July, eleven of them men received death sentences, three walked free, and the rest faced 
prison terms.  This trial provided the blueprints for the rapidly growing number of wrecking trials throughout the 
Soviet Union and also gave Stalin practice for the lat r Moscow trials.  See Julie Cassiday’s “Marble Columns and 
Jupiter Lights,” pp. 648-649. Simon Montefiore argues that this trial was part of the Bolsheviks “hatred of technical 
experts” who criticized Stalin’s plans.  See Stalin:  Court of the Red Tsar  (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, p. 
37) 
32 Julie Cassiday, “Marble Columns and Jupiter Lights,” p. 656. 
 18
 Chapter 3 continues with the 1937 trial of Radek, Piatakov, and others and shows that 
with the continually worsening conflict in Spain combined with increased fascist aggression in 
Germany and militaristic aggression from Japan, criticism for Stalin’s trials and the Soviet Union 
grew as Western governments questioned the strength of the Red Army and the ability of the 
Soviet Union to stand against conflict.  Despite Stalin’s attempt to change the wrongs of the 
1936 trial, the second trial met with resistance especially because of the defendants on trial.  
Many journalists and government officials were close with Radek and found it difficult to 
believe his guilt. 
 Chapter 4 discusses the Bukharin trial of 1938.  Stalin’s final Moscow trial was the most 
publicized and consequently the most criticized.  The chapter also examines how the messages 
changed with each trial.  By 1937 and then 1938, the charges and conspiracies became 
increasingly international in nature and suggest Stalin attempted to grab support from anywhere 
in order to preserve the Soviet Union and his personal power, even if this meant a more reserved 
outlook on Germany. 
 The fifth and final chapter attempts to understand Stalin’s intentions for holding the trials 
and suggests that his endeavor was in fact one of foreign and not just domestic policy, and that it 
ultimately failed due to the crises in Europe and the United States. 
 If one returns to Sokol’s earlier definition of one certain type of trial, it becomes easier to 
modify this to create a more accurate definition of what a show trial is.  A show trial is one 
brought about as a central authority either believes itself in jeopardy or strives to simulate 
jeopardy for political advantage, popular support, and/or more centralized power.  This is done 
through audience participation and mass communication based on both past and contemporary 
social and political themes.  Put together correctly, a show trial often can play out more as 
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theater than judicial process.  Using Joseph Stalin’s Moscow trials of 1936, 1937, and 1938, the 
following chapters will examine the most important part of a show trial:  audience reaction—
primarily, Western reaction to the Soviet drama.  Everything from audience composition and 
prosecution’s interrogations to defendants’ demeanors and attendees’ personal beliefs affected 
what those in the West got out of the trials.  It is also imperative to examine the international 
situation of the 1930s to understand whether contemporary opinions changed or remained the 
same through the course of the trials and why this wa  so. 
  
“TROTSKYISM IS FASCIST TERRORISM”:  THE WORLD REACTS TO THE AUGUST 
1936 ZINOVIEV-KAMENEV TRIAL 
 
On August 19, 1936, Joseph Stalin’s first major show trial began.  Grigory Zinoviev, Lev 
Kamenev, and fourteen others entered the Moscow courtro m facing a number of charges that 
painted a picture of a deep, complex conspiracy.  While show trials were nothing new, especially 
in the Soviet Union, few had been as big or seemingly as important.  Even though Stalin 
intended this first trial to be heard mostly by a domestic audience, foreign observers were still 
present.  As the trial progressed Soviet citizens and the world watched the events unfold, and 
because of the international situation regarded the scenario with uncertainty over Stalin’s 
intentions. 
 By the middle of 1936, Europe and the Soviet Union had experienced a series of events 
that helped explain public reaction to the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial.  On March 7, Hitler 
reoccupied the Rhineland in defiance of both the Treaty of Versailles and the 1925 Locarno Pact 
that had neutralized the earlier border dispute.  This not only weakened Stalin’s belief in the 
willingness of Western powers to stand up to Hitler, but also gave Stalin reason to put his plan 
into action:  “Within a few days after the German entry into the Rhineland, Stalin gave orders, 
secretly, for the preparation of the first of the tree great purge trials…Just after this…the draft 
of the new constitution was published.”1 By combining the threat of German aggression with the 
possibility of more civil freedoms, Stalin met with less resistance to the trial domestically.  As if 
to further support Stalin’s claim of fascist and terrorist threats to the Soviet Union, the Spanish 
Civil War began in mid-July 1936.  Shortly after, Western nations and the Soviet Union 
approved a French agreement of nonintervention in Spain.  Stalin hoped this would slow the 
spread of fascist aggression, but by August and September, he realized this was not the case and 
                                                
1 George Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (New York:  Mentor Books, 1960), p. 288. 
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began to send military aid to the Republicans to fight the German and Italian-backed 
Nationalists.  Thus the trial that began in August could serve domestically remove opposition to 
Stalin’s possible preparation for war and to eliminate opponents.  At the same time, such a trial 
could also serve foreign policy goals by showing the rest of the world that the Soviet Union was 
willing to defend itself, to stand up to fascist aggression, and that the Soviet Union was a worthy 
nation to have as an ally. 
 The trial did not take place in what one would traditionally think of as a courtroom 
setting.  Rather, the defendants faced questioning i  the Nobles Club.  As Time magazine 
observed, 
As thick clouds rolled over Moscow one afternoon last week the ornate 
chandeliers of the onetime Nobles Club were lighted, Soviet soldiers in blue caps 
appeared with fixed bayonets, and some 500 people wer admitted to the stately 
Hall of Columns after their credentials had been checked and rechecked by 
sentries at the doors.2 
 
Harold Denny of the New York Times painted a picture of the setting in such a way that t e 
reader would think of theater rather than judicial proceedings, which was Stalin’s plan:  “In a 
frivolous ballroom of a vanished nobility, where dancing girls in the plaster frieze smile down on 
sixteen doomed revolutionaries, a fantastic drama is moving toward its final curtain.”3 
The defendants came from a variety of places and occupations.  Konon Berman-Yurin 
had been a member of the German Communist Party (KPD) and a freelance writer.  Mossei and 
Nathan Lurye also both worked for the KPD, and Fritz David, like Berman-Yurin was a 
freelance writer and member of the KPD.  Valentine Olberg worked in Berlin and moved to the 
Soviet Union to become an educator. 
                                                
2 “Perfect Dictator,” Time, Vol. XXVIII, No. 9, August 31, 1936, p. 16. 
3 Harold Denny, “Trials Dramatize Soviet Struggles,” New York Times, August 23, 1936, p. E5. 
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 Ivan Bakayev worked for the Cheka, the Soviet police organization, and became a 
member of the Leningrad Soviet.  Grigori Evdokimov had been Secretary of the Leningrad 
Committee and held a seat on the Petrograd Council of Trade Unions.  Edouard Holtzmann held 
an administrative post for the Soviet Communist Pary nd Richard Pickel had been a secretary 
of Grigori Zinoviev’s.  Vagarshak Ter-Vaganyan was the leader of the Armenian Communist 
Party.  Isak Reingold held posts as Deputy People’s Commissar of Finance and Agriculture.  
Ephim Dreitzer served as an officer of the Red Army in the Civil War and was part of Trotsky’s 
personal bodyguard.  Sergei Mrachovsky had been commander of the Urals military district.  
Ivan Smirnov was leader of the Siberian forces during the Civil War, eventually became a 
member of the Revolutionary Committee of the East and was the People’s Commissar of Soviet 
Postal Services and Telegraph.4 
 The two main defendants, however, were Grigori Zinov ev and Lev Kamenev.  Zinoviev 
initially worked closely with Lenin and even returned from exile with him in 1917, but his 
disagreement with Lenin over the nature of a Bolshevik takeover led to growing tension within 
the Party.  Zinoviev’s willingness to negotiate with anti-Bolsheviks put him out of favor with 
Lenin even more and led to Trotsky taking position as second-in-command.  Despite clashes 
with Trotsky, Zinoviev managed to gain a post as head of the Communist International 
(Comintern) in 1919 and became a member of the Central Committee.  After Lenin’s death he 
briefly sided with Stalin against Trotsky, but once Stalin rendered Trotsky ineffective, he turned 
his attention toward removal of other possible opposition, namely Zinoviev and Kamenev.  After 
Zinoviev’s removal from the Politburo in 1927, he bowed to Stalin’s power and rejoined the 
Party until his arrest at the end of 1934 for an alleged hand in Sergei Kirov’s assassination. 
                                                
4 Descriptions of the defendants come from Not Guilty:  Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials (New York:  Harper & Brothers, 1938). 
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 Kamenev, like Zinoviev, was one of the original Central Committee members, but had a 
falling out over the violent nature of the Bolshevik coup in 1917.  After the Revolution, he 
became Chairman of the Moscow Soviet in 1918 and worked with Stalin to remove Trotsky from 
power in the mid-1920s.  Stalin then turned on the two men and after Kamenev’s expulsion from 
the Party and his ensuing capitulation to Stalin’s power, he and Zinoviev found themselves in 
prison for Kirov’s murder, where they remained until the 1936 trial.5 
The lead prosecutor, Andrei Vyshinsky, was the Prosecutor General of the Soviet Union.  
After presiding over a number of earlier trials, including the 1933 Metro-Vickers Trial of British 
engineers, he strengthened his reputation as a merciless and aggressive lawyer, speechmaker, and 
interrogator by constantly degrading and shaming the defendants of all three Moscow show 
trials.6  The judge for all three was Vasily Ulrich, a man who was noted for his short, fast-paced 
trials and his carrying out of verdicts, primarily executions.  His job provided him with less 
notoriety than Vyshinsky, however.  In the Soviet Union as a judge, Ulrich did not have to 
support a particular process of law that would be favorable to defendant or prosecutor; rather, he 
determined sentencing and handed out verdicts, which in this case came from Stalin. 
The charges seemed straightforward enough—the defenants planned to organize 
terrorist groups to sabotage Soviet plans for advancing the country.  This included assassination 
                                                
5 Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky never fully recovered from the expulsion in the first place.  Attempts to 
defend themselves met only with harsher criticism and nger from an uncooperative audience, and even aft r 
repeated self-criticism, Zinoviev and Kamenev still ended up in prison as they were easy scapegoat targets for 
Stalin.  Roy Medvedev’s Let History Judge (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1989) provides such 
background as is mentioned above. 
6 After holding his post as Prosecutor, Vyshinsky was Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs.  
His talent for creating scapegoats remained in his work in Soviet-American relations.  Valentin Berezhkov, Stalin’s 
interpreter, recalled an incident in which a telegram’s arrival to the United States faced delays.  There was nothing 
wrong on the Soviet end, but Stalin wanted someone t  blame and requested Vyshinsky’s help.  As Berezhkov 
contacted him, he knew Vyshinsky would “surely find a culprit” See Valentin Berezhkov’s At Stalin’s Side (New 
York:  Birch Lane Press, 1994), p. 213.  His role in the Moscow trials was considerable as he ended up choosing 
most of the prosecution and he helped create the charges and questions to be asked of the defendants.  In he matter 
of public trials, Vyshinsky “knew how to create the illusion of lawfulness”, and it often worked to his advantage See 
Arkady Vaksberg, Stalin’s Prosecutor:  The Life of Andrei Vyshinsky (New York:  Grove Weidenfeld, 1990), p. 69. 
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of high-ranking Party officials such as Stalin with the help of foreign agents.  The court also 
implicated the men in the murder of Sergei Kirov and explained that all these plans were the 
creation of the Soviet Union’s number one enemy, Leon Trotsky. 
 The trial did not have the international feel of future ones; rather, it proved more useful to 
Stalin as a method of removing internal opposition.  Many in Stalin’s government did wish for 
Party stability, especially as “Old Bolsheviks were no longer useful for constructive purposes 
simply because they had been brought up to be negativ  critics of everything.”7 The question 
was, however, why was it necessary to remove these m n?  It is impossible to know Stalin’s 
thoughts, but many people around the world at that time believed that Stalin was turning his back 
on the world especially as he instituted a program of socialism-in-one-country. 
 As the trial began, there was not a large number of foreign observers on hand, so most 
people in the Western nations relied on these few for details.  Joseph Phillips, writing for the 
New York Herald Tribune, made it a point to discuss the appearance and demeanor of defendants 
and court officials.  The Tribune had a Republican voice that frequently called for at least some 
degree of American involvement in international affairs.  It was a nationally circulated and well-
respected newspaper with many loyal readers. 
 For Phillips, many of the defendants maintained at le st a small amount of dignity, as 
“even the years which some of them had passed in prison had not altogether obliterated the 
stamp of authority from their dress and bearing.”8 Kamenev, Reingold, and Yevdokimov all 
entered the courtroom shaved and neatly dressed.  Zinoviev, however, had the unkempt look of a 
                                                
7 Joel Carmichael, Stalin’s Masterpiece (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1976), p. 208. 
8 Joseph Phillips, “16 Admit Plot to Slay Stalin, Rule Russia,” New York Herald Tribune, Volume XCVI, 
No. 32, August 20, 1936, p. 35.  The Tribune earlier became known for its publication of journalist accounts on the 
deplorable conditions in the Western Soviet Union due to famine and disease, prompting Soviet officials to ban 
journalists from traveling the country.  See S. J. Taylor, Stalin’s Apologist, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1990), p. 202. 
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man who was resigned to his fate and realized it too late.  It is clear that Phillips did not believe 
that defendants gave confessions due to torture.  Th y seemed to be treated well and managed to 
keep at least some pride throughout the trial. 
 Harold Denny, a journalist for the New York Times, agreed with his colleague’s 
assessment.  Denny earlier covered allegations of famine and death in the Ukraine along with 
Times journalist Walter Duranty.  After writing that he saw nothing but the growth and eventual 
victory of Soviet collectivization, many began to argue Denny was an apologist for the Soviet 
Union, which may have been why Stalin allowed him to attend the trials.  Denny believed that 
“Kameneff seemed unchanged, still animated and distinguished-looking…Zinovieff, however, 
looked utterly beaten, chagrined, and apathetic.  Once stout, he is thin, haggard, and tired.”9 
Again, this did not seem to be because of torture.  Rather, Zinoviev realized the consequences of 
his actions that brought him to trial and thus regretted them too late.  The whole trial for Denny 
made sense because the defendants all jumped to their feet and quickly and emphatically added 
to the prosecution’s accusations.  Who else but guilty men would be so willing to confess and 
give such detailed testimony? 
 Time magazine’s writers were always interested in covering stories in terms of the people 
involved in events.  Editor Henry Luce wanted the magazine to emphasize pop culture and 
entertainment, and this style of writing transferred to coverage of the Moscow trials.  Like other 
periodicals, Time recognized Zinoviev’s state as “unshaven…wild-haired…” while Kamenev 
maintained a dignified appearance and spoke to the audience “with the air of a professor 
                                                
9 Harold Denny, “16 in Soviet Admit 2 Plots on Stalin,” New York Times, August 20, 1936, p. 5.  Like most 
Western journalists, Denny often had a difficult time with the Soviet Press Office.  Denny thus faced arguments with 
both the Soviets and with his predecessor, Walter Duranty, who felt Denny’s writing ability was well below his.  
Despite many problems, Denny still often pointed out that the trials seemed legitimate, at least to the extent that the 
defendants confessed.  The Times continued to print Duranty’s pro-Soviet writing as well as Denny’s vague 
assessments of the Moscow trials.  See Taylor’s Stalin’s Apologist. 
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addressing pupils of none too great intelligence…”10 The magazine continued to be critical of the 
trials over the next three years. 
 Newspapers continually debated why the trials were h ld in the first place.  Harold 
Denny felt that Stalin had both domestic and global intentions.  Because international politics 
and most political parties around the world were in such turmoil during the 1930s, the 
Communist movement would definitely feel the effects of such deep plots to remove its leaders.  
Stalin’s prime enemy, Trotsky, had to be removed in order for Stalin to gain more recognition, 
and so Denny argued that “Trotsky’s prestige before the world proletariat is to be destroyed, and 
what better way to destroy it than to prove that he is an arch-assassin and in league with 
Fascists?” Within the Soviet Union, Denny wrote that t e trial was “the nub of what must be the 
final destruction of the opposition to Stalin’s policies…”11 He believed the defendants were 
telling the truth in their confessions, and thus Stalin held the trial to remove the any possible 
oppositionist elements of the Communist movement inside and outside the country. 
 Around the world, publications began to receive, print, and interpret the reactions of 
eyewitnesses to the trial.  In Great Britain, the editors of The Economist argued strongly their 
case for why the trial occurred.  The publication since its birth in 1843 always supported 
economic freedom and strengthened international cooperation and continually opposed such 
ideas as socialism, especially for its unreasonable desire for government involvement in citizens’ 
daily lives.  The editors recalled the Metropolitan-Vickers affair in 1933 that implicated British 
engineers in sabotage charges, and they scoffed at the 1936 trial much in the same way:  “the 
circuses and fait accomplis by which Fascist regimes compensate their citizens for the lack of 
                                                
10 Time, Volume XXVIII, No. 9, August 31, 1936, p. 16.  Time’s criticisms remained after the trials ended, 
and often the editors seemed rather cynical about America’s dealings with the Soviet Union.  After Duranty’s death, 
the magazine remembered him as the top “Russian apologist in the West” (Time, October 14, 1957, p. 110). 
11 Harold Denny, “Trials Dramatize Soviet Struggles,” p. E5. 
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butter on their bread are replaced in Russia by gigant c State trials of saboteurs…”12 The editors 
argued that the Soviet government came out stronger i  its ability to deal with internal affairs, 
but in foreign affairs the attempt at cooperation with countries such as Great Britain and Poland 
was only fading rapidly.  The primary reason for the rial was that is was an attempt to hide the 
shortcomings of the Soviet government from its citizens, and the international fallout was an 
afterthought according to The Economist. 
 Max Shachtman held a slightly different interpretation of the trial and voiced multiple 
reasons for Stalin’s actions, a number of them based on international developments.  Shachtman, 
once an American Trotskyist and then leader of the Ind pendent Socialist League, which 
eventually merged with the Socialist Party, pointed out Stalin’s shortcomings in Spain during 
this time period.  In terms of a world stage, he believ d Stalin held the trials not only “to distract 
the attention of the Soviet masses from the stirring events in Spain” but also “to inform the world 
bourgeoisie or those among them with whom Stalin desperately seeks a military alliance that 
Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev…are through for good…that Stalin is worthy of the confidence 
of the bourgeoisie who need not be troubled with any fears of world revolution being tolerated 
by the Kremlin.”13 He also mentioned that the trial was a way of showing CPSU members that 
even though the Constitution guaranteed freedoms, Stalin would handle criticism accordingly. 
Trial observers such as Denny and Phillips never really ntertained the possibility of 
defendants giving confession under torture, but Shachtman could not believe that any of these 
men would so incredibly eagerly jump to their feet to denounce themselves and each other.  He 
                                                
12 “Trial By and For the People,” The Economist, Volume CXXIV, No. 4852, August 22, 1936, p. 364. 
13 Max Shachtman, “The Moscow Trial,” Socialist Appeal:  An Organ of Revolutionary Socialism, Volume 
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argued “one cannot come to any other conclusion except that the ‘confessions’ were made to 
order.  The defendants must have felt themselves under some moral, mental or physical 
compulsion to make the kind of confessions they did.”14 Like many, Shachtman also lamented 
the decision of the court to execute the defendants.  For him, this proved only that Stalin was 
never interested in the advancement of true socialism and rather desired to maintain and 
strengthen his own personal power, more like a tyrannical dictator than a figurehead of equality 
and justice.  It was absurd to think that men who had fought for years to end the chains of the 
Old Regime in Russia would really desire the help of the Nazi government, whose conflicting 
ideals could never match those of the Socialist movement. 
          There were also British observers at the trial, and while many in Great Britain 
remembered what had happened in earlier Soviet trials, some defended Stalin and the Soviet 
Union.  Denis Pritt, a member of the Labour Party, argued that many in his country jumped to 
hasty conclusions about how wrong the trials were.  H  felt that those who criticized did not fully 
understand that Soviet courts worked differently from British ones, and Pritt attempted to address 
the main concerns of the opposition.  On the issue of the quick guilty pleas of the defendants, he 
pointed out that “prisoners do sometimes plead guilty to charges…when they see that the 
evidence against them is overwhelming.”15 The trial could not possibly have been staged because 
it lasted too long and the confessions were too detailed for anyone to recite perfectly over such a 
lengthy period of time:  “Months of rehearsal by the most competent actors could not have 
enabled false participants in such a contest to las ten minutes without disclosing the falsity…”16  
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Pritt also felt that the relaxed atmosphere in the courtroom cancelled out the argument 
that interrogators tortured the prisoners before they ook the stand.  The trial was convincing 
because the Soviet Union was economically and political y stable and there was a good chance 
that plots did exist to overthrow Stalin.  Pritt, who constantly argued for a British military 
alliance with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, believed Stalin held the trial for purely 
internal purposes.  It was simply to judge whether e was an attempted overthrow of the 
government and had nothing to do with the situation in Spain or the slow progress of 
industrialization.  To explain the relationship of the timing of the trial with the Spanish Civil 
War, Pritt wrote, “but why it should be thought that the prosecution was launched just at the time 
it was, for any other reason than that the evidence had not been discovered earlier but had been 
discovered then, I do not know.”17 Pritt’s desire for protection against Germany overrul d his 
memory of past British treatment in trials held by the Soviet Union. 
The Communist Party of the United States also watched t e trial carefully and held a 
variety of views on the 1936 trial and those that followed.  Throughout the 1930s the Party grew 
into a powerful force in American politics.  This was largely because the group was outspoken 
over issues that most worried Americans at the time, ncluding unemployment, continued 
economic depression, and the most pressing, the potential threat of fascism in the country.  The 
Party may have been located in the United States, but it took orders from the Comintern, which 
by 1936 followed Stalin’s policies and orders.  Because of this, once the Comintern adopted the 
Popular Front tactic in 1935, the CPUSA found itself r luctantly cooperating with the Socialist 
Party under Stalin’s desire for a United Front against fascism.18  American Communists were 
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also confused over what to do about Franklin Roosevelt.  For years they had fervently opposed 
the president, but they had to try and quiet criticism after Stalin praised him as a strong leader of 
the capitalist world.  The Party continued to have reservations about Roosevelt’s policies, 
especially over the situation in Spain: “No issue so touched the Party or did more to bolster its 
influence among liberals as the Spanish Civil War.”19  
The Party found Roosevelt’s foreign policy embarrassing because of his apparent 
unwillingness to aid Loyalist forces in Spain despite Stalin’s supposed attempts to do so.  This 
was compounded by a reaction of disgust toward a formal statement given by France in August 
1936, shortly before the first trial, calling for Western nonintervention in Spain.  Fascism had 
been the prime enemy of the CPUSA for so long, and the claims in Zinoviev’s trial of fascist 
espionage only seemed to prove Stalin was correct.  This especially rang true with younger, more 
outspoken Communists, whose only “formative political experiences were the Depression and 
the rise of fascism.”20  
Jay Lovestone, a prominent member of the Party and once delegate to the Comintern, 
assessed the trials in terms of history and revolutionary thought.  According to Lovestone, the 
same situation had played out nearly 150 years earlier in Paris:  “The conversion of political 
cases into criminal trials by charging political opp nents with impossible and fantastic ‘crimes’ 
is no diabolical invention of Stalin’s…but seems to arise out of the very conditions of factional-
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political struggle in revolutionary times.”21 In revolutionary France, the old order was corrupt 
and faced threats and aggression from Tory England, just as revolutionary Russia confronted 
Nazi Germany.  Lovestone, who earlier had differences with the Comintern over the nature of 
world revolution, judged the trials not on the validity of the charges the defendants faced, but on 
political aims and considerations.  The trials were part of the revolution, and since the choice was 
either Stalin or Trotsky, the question was, “which tendency was carrying forward the interests of 
the revolution and which was destroying it?”22 According to Lovestone, Stalin was the 
progressive force, and Trotsky was the counter-revolutionary figure working against a promising 
future for the Soviet Union and world Communism.  False charges or not, the trial was part of 
advancing a much needed revolution.                                   Moving the revolution along was 
only one part of the American Communist ideal.  Strengthening the Party itself was a high 
priority for long time members like Alexander Bittelman, a prominent figure in the executive 
committee of the CPUSA.  The capture and destruction of assassins and murderers prevented the 
downfall of a Soviet government that had already made numerous positive advances toward 
spreading communist ideology throughout the world.  Bittelman, like many others, was certain 
that fascist terrorists were behind the plots brought forth in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, and this 
proved the existence of possible terrorism all around the world.  He believed this was one major 
reason for the slow growth of the CPUSA.  In an article published almost immediately after the 
trial, Bittelman made the connection that “Trotskyim today stands exposed not only as an ally of 
fascism objectively but as a current in fascism.  Trotskyism today is fascism.”23 
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American Communists also likened Trotsky to a Nazi Party accomplice because of his 
posture on the new Soviet Constitution.  Although not officially adopted until the end of 1936, 
many around the world knew of the giant steps being taken to guarantee civil rights and safety 
for Russian citizens and thus praised the Constitution and Stalin’s regime.  Bittelman, however, 
pointed out that “publicly and in print both Trotsky and Goebbels denounce the new Soviet 
Constitution.  Goebbels calls it ‘tyranny’; Trotsky calls it ‘Bonapartism’.”24 It was clear that 
Trotsky felt the same as even the worst of the Nazi P rty, and because of this the plots brought 
out in the trial must have been true. American Communists so frequently referenced 
revolutionary France in their arguments because of distinct parallels they saw with the Soviet 
Union.  CPUSA members were very knowledgeable when it came to historical events, and they 
proved this repeatedly.  The French Revolution showed the overthrow of an oppressive 
monarchy and the creation of a liberal state that provided many more rights for its citizens, much 
as the Bolsheviks were thought to have done in the early twentieth century.  Conflicting 
ideologies such as those of the Girondins quickly died as the ruling groups held trials and 
consequently executed opposition.  The success of the French Revolution gave hope to many that 
the same process would occur in the Soviet Union. 
This is not to say that American Communists did not have their doubts about the trials.  
In an unsigned editorial in a September issue of The Workers Age, possibly written by 
Lovestone, the author questions the outcome of the trial. Even though Trotskyist conspirators 
clearly worked hand in hand with the Nazi government, “other and sufficiently adequate 
punishment could have been meted out without resorting to executions.” Such harsh justice only 
hurt the chances for the democratization of Party leadership within the Comintern and the Soviet 
Union.  “Furthermore,” the editor added, “we do nothesitate to say that the bureaucratic regime 
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of Stalin in the CPSU makes it extremely difficult for healthy, constructive critical opposition 
forces developing in the Party ranks.”25 While the argument may seem odd, the point was that 
allowing such criticism could help prevent future counterrevolutionary activities through the use 
of discussion and compromise.  Such statements showagain the desire of the CPUSA to 
strengthen their political ideology. 
Communists were not the only ones afraid of fascist aggression, although they arguably 
were the loudest opponents.  Even for those who were disgusted at the far-fetched charges and 
the death sentences, Stalin seemed less frightening tha  a Nazi Germany that was steadily 
growing stronger:  “Western radical opinion in 1936 had no desire to annoy Stalin…Democrats 
believed that in the cause of fighting fascism critics of Stalin’s judicial murders had to be 
muzzled.”26 Thus, many of those who disapproved of one or bothof Hitler and Stalin’s 
ideologies ended up joining together after a decision on the lesser of two evils. 
One prominent international figure who had faced problems because of the show trials 
was Leon Blum, the head of the Popular Front governm nt in France. He found himself in a 
difficult position.  After the Spanish Civil War broke out, Blum did not want to risk alienating 
conservatives in France and possibly causing civil war in his own country.  Because of this, he 
called for a policy of neutrality in Spain, which only angered members of his own Popular Front 
government.27 
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After the signing of a Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact on May 2, 1935 aimed at 
preventing further German advances in Europe, Stalin’s military spokesman in France began to 
pressure Blum to add more direct specifications about military collaboration.  Tensions between 
France and the Soviet Union had always been high becaus  of the former’s intervention in the 
Russian Civil War and the latter’s unwillingness to pay back debts left over from the days of 
tsarist Russia.  By early 1936 the French foreign office under Pierre Laval “emphasized the 
likelihood that Germany would see in the pact a threat of encirclement and that Romania and 
Poland…would grow alarmed.”28 
Because of this problem, Blum had to think about Eastern Europe and Great Britain—
valuable allies against fascist aggression.  With the onset of the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial in 
August 1936, “Blum could not have known at the time” that the charges against the defendants 
held little credibility, “but the trials and purges were admittedly not of a nature to inspire the 
continuation of secret military talks.”29 Blum could not know how stable the Soviet Union really 
was in the wake of the purges and trials, and thus while Stalin desired international sympathy 
and support for his alleged fight against fascist terrorism, at times the only result was uncertainty 
and hesitance from the West when dealing with the Soviet Union.  Interestingly, self-
preservation was apparently more important to Blum, because by November 1936 he decided to 
attempt entering secret military discussions with the Soviet Union, but later claimed “to have 
ceased his requests…to undertake negotiations with Russia at the end of 1936 after receiving 
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advice from…[Czech President] Benes…as [Soviet Union] was suspected of renewing its 
contacts with Germany.”30 
The Economist did not hide bitterness at the outcome of the trial and the death sentences 
handed out to the defendants.  While they never really discussed the international implications of 
the trial, which was “abounding in evidence for theprosecution and rendered farcical by abject 
pleas of ‘Guilty’,” the editors foresaw internal problems ahead for the Soviet Union.  They 
argued that “Stalin…won a victory for his policy of turning Soviet Russia to the 
Right…Bolshevism has ended” and “a period of internal political struggles in Russia” was about 
to begin.31 
The tone of the article published in Time magazine after the trial could be described as 
bitter.  The editors argued that the outcome would have deep effects on world Communism.  
Communists in the Third International now had hope that Trotsky’s so-called “Fourth 
International” would never grow strong enough to effect the Soviet Union’s policies, and at the 
same time Trotsky lost a great deal of credibility.  Time pointed out “almost nothing came out 
which was not directly or indirectly to Stalin’s personal advantage,” and “the Moscow trial had 
the effect of giving Communists all over the world something else to think about instead of why 
Joseph Stalin had still not sent a single Soviet bomber to aid the Red militia armies in Spain.”32 
Thus, according to Time’s editors, the growing crisis in Spain played a large role in how Stalin’s 
courtroom drama played out. 
 Even in London, an article in The Times lamented the death sentences with a headline 
reading “Slender Hopes of Reprieve”.  The article continued on with a report from a 
correspondent in Oslo who wrote of Trotsky’s response to the verdicts.  For the editors of The 
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Times, the 1936 trial’s purpose clearly was for removal of Stalin’s opposition.  The article 
included part of Trotsky’s statement that “Either [Soviet government] can really execute 
[defendants] to prove the authenticity of their accusations against the others, or the Government 
can change the death sentences…and eventually release them later.  They will certainly make 
their choice after considering what impression the case…will make through all the civilized 
world.”33  Stalin apparently realized that saving some defendants from the firing squad, at least 
temporarily, would be important if it helped lead to possible military and economic cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and Western nations such as Great Britain. 
While the world had witnessed large show trials in the Soviet Union before, many 
regarded the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial in August 1936 with hesitation and uncertainty.  The 
prosecution’s claims of sabotage, espionage, and attemp ed murder captivated those who read 
about the trials and those who dealt directly with the Soviet government.  While this first trial 
implicated outside agitators, primarily Nazis, it did not go into as much detail over complex 
international plots to remove Stalin as the later trials would.  Rather, many observers assessed 
that Stalin was removing internal opposition either to himself or to the advancement of 
Communism. 
Many major points of debate arose from the trials, nd many journalists who observed the 
events firsthand agreed that none of the defendants appeared to have been tortured or punished.  
However, it is most important to understand how the trials fit into the international situation of 
the 1930s, especially as most observers based their conclusions about it on what else was 
happening in the world.  Communists in the United States focused primarily on the prevention of 
fascist aggression, claiming that Stalin, by catching conspirators before they could carry out their 
plans, continued to be a leading figure in the anti-fascist movement.  The Spanish Civil War was 
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perceived as the first major conflict between fascism and the rest of the world, and the CPUSA 
sat helpless under Roosevelt’s unwillingness to aid Spain while Stalin rushed to the rescue.  
American Communists compared revolutionary Russia to revolutionary France and praised the 
Soviet Union for its attempt to throw off the shackles of an old order.  Supporters of Stalin also 
praised the trial as a victory for the world Communist movement, and the uncovering of secret 
plots provided an excuse for the slow progress of world revolution in general, especially in the 
case of the CPUSA.  With Trotsky out of the way, there was a better chance for Stalin and the 
Comintern’s policies to go ahead without obstruction.  Only a handful of Communist critics 
argued that Stalin was removing all the key elements of revolution through his staged trials and 
executions. 
It may never be known whether Stalin held his trial in 1936 simply to remove internal 
opposition or for more.  Even if his original objectives were purely domestic, foreign reactions to 
the first trial may have led him to conclude that future trials might serve an international 
objective as well.  The Spanish Civil War, depression, and the continued growth of Nazi 
Germany made it impossible for outsiders to interprt the Moscow trials only in the Soviet 
context.  While opinions about the Soviet Union alre dy varied based on political ideology and 
the perceived threat of violence and terror, the trial in August 1936 helped to perfect future 
dramas and consequently enhanced the divide between opposition and support for Stalin’s 
regime. 
THE INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN POWERS AND THE THREAT OF WAR:  STALIN’S 
MESSAGE TO THE WORLD IN THE 1937 TRIAL OF RADEK AND OTHERS 
 
After the drama of the 1936 Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, Stalin provided the world with 
another courtroom play at the beginning of 1937.  This time, the two main defendants, Karl 
Radek and Yuri Pyatakov, allegedly formed the “Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center” and attempted 
espionage, wrecking, treason, and other terrorist activities.  Compared to the first trial, there was 
a larger international audience on hand and more newspaper coverage, and because of this a 
larger number of people around the world followed the events in January 1937.  The Western 
reaction for the 1937 trial was more straightforward compared to that of 1936.  This was largely 
due to the higher amount of sympathy for and personal k owledge about the defendants, as well 
as a greater understanding of what a Soviet trial real y was.  The Zinoviev-Kamenev trial had 
been a practice run for both Stalin and the West, and because of the worsening international 
situation, there was less sympathy for the Radek-Pyatakov trial; rather, it received a greater 
amount of skepticism and criticism from the West. 
After the relative obscurity of the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, Stalin realized he needed to 
perfect the next one, which he held in January 1937.  The names were bigger as defendants like 
Karl Radek had a large international following, and the charges were more serious, especially 
with the heightened tensions in Europe.  The Spanish C vil War was quickly turning into a lost 
cause for the Soviet Union as Fascist forces advanced rapidly across Spain, and what little aid 
Stalin provided to the Republican forces slowed to a stop.  An increasingly aggressive Japanese 
army that had taken over a large part of the Chinese mainland threatened the Soviet Union’s 
eastern border, and Stalin used this in an attempt to gain support from the United States, where 
sanctions against that nation caused many Americans to worry about Japanese retaliation. 
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By the beginning of 1937, Soviet-German relations were already in a deplorable state.  In 
October 1936, Hitler and Mussolini had concluded an It lo-German alliance in light of the events 
in Spain.  One month later, Germany and Japan signed a d publicized the Anti-Comintern Pact, 
which recognized the threat posed by the Communist International to each country’s power.  
While the wording suggested the detection and prevention of communism, it was clear that the 
pacts all considered the Soviet Union as enemy number one.  To Stalin, the Pact could have 
meant anything from agreements on sharing secrets to something as extreme as the introduction 
of a two-front war against the Soviet Union.1  Keeping in mind deteriorating bilateral relations, it 
would be difficult in 1936 and 1937 to disagree that t e Soviet Union’s borders might be 
threatened by two aggressor nations.  This made it much easier for Stalin to include in his trials 
stories of German collaboration with agents of Trotsky and the possibility of an oncoming world 
war.  Stalin apparently hoped the implication of Japanese and German agents in efforts to bring 
about the downfall of the Soviet Union and the defendants’ promise of Soviet territory to aid 
these powers would worry the rest of the West.  However, even after two trials, foreign support 
for Stalin remained stable while criticism grew. 
 Foreign opposition to the trials became more widespr ad with the creation of various 
committees that defended Trotsky, and none was morei portant than John Dewey’s 
Commission, which refuted a large part of the prosecution’s evidence and published the findings 
on a mass scale.  While countries like France and Great Britain worked to create alliances against 
fascist aggression, Stalin’s trials cast doubt over th  stability of the Soviet government and its 
ability to effectively fulfill military obligations to other nations working to contain Hitler.  At 
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this point, even U. S. Communists questioned Stalin’s reasoning for continuing trials and 
inventing charges, although they maintained support for the advancement of communism.  By 
the end of 1937 and the prospect of another trial looming, much of the support for Stalin’s 
regime turned into hesitance and uncertainty over Soviet effectiveness, while critics had more 
reason to discredit the show trials, especially as the world headed toward war. 
As with the first trial less than a year earlier, the second trial took place in the Nobles 
Club, once a dance hall and dinner room for the nobility of the pre-Bolshevik era.  Ornate 
architecture and lightning surrounded the defendants d “the long, pillared courtroom, 
ornamented with a frieze of cupids” played host as “…the 17 went to trial in the elaborate 
ballroom where nobles of the czar feted their ladies in a bygone era.”2 Walter Duranty, a reporter 
for the New York Times, summed up the feeling of the trial and courtroom best in a January 1937 
article: 
That is an amazing feature of these Moscow trials:  They all have an element of 
theatre, and yet it is not just a play, for the losers pay with their lives.  This trial is 
pure Hamlet, but there will be no comeback for the actors when the curtain falls.3 
 
 Much like the trial of the previous year, the defendants came from backgrounds and 
offices that were well suited to carry out the alleged conspiracies and plans to take down Stalin 
and rattle Soviet stability.  Yuri Pyatakov was Deputy People’s Commissar (PC) of Heavy 
Industry, Ivan Hrasche worked in the Soviet nitrogen industry, and Gavriil Pushin and Stanislav 
Ratachaik held posts in the Central Administration of the Chemical Industry.  In addition, Alexei 
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Shestov was a member of the Eastern and Siberian Col Trust, and Mikhail Stroilov was Chief 
Engineer of the Kuzbas Coal Trust. 
 The list of defendants also included a number of wrkers in the field of transportation.  
Leonid Serebryakov was Deputy PC of Transportation, and Yakov Livshitz held the same title 
over Soviet railroads.  Ivan Knayazev was Chief of the Southern Railroad, and Yosif Turok was 
Chief of the Urals Railroad.  Boris Norkin was a member of the West Siberian Territory 
Commission.  Mikhail Boguslavsky was Chairman of the Committee of the Council of People’s 
Commissars.  Yakov Drobnis served in the Red Army and became Chairman of the Poltava 
Soviet.  Nikolai Muralov was Inspector-General of the Red Army and Deputy PC of Agriculture.  
Grigori Sokolnikov held posts as PC of Finance, Deputy PC of Foreign Affairs, and in 1929 
served as an ambassador to Great Britain.4 
 Karl Radek had lived in Poland until authorities exiled him in 1908 on the grounds of 
practicing subversive political activity through the Social Democratic Party.  He moved to 
Germany and eventually met with Lenin during Lenin’s exile from Russia.  After the abdication 
of Nicholas II, Radek headed to Russia on the same train as Lenin and became a member of the 
Central Committee of the Bolsheviks.  After the signin  of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in 1918, he 
took charge of the Central European division of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.  He 
assisted in organizing Communist Party movements in Germany until his arrest in 1919.  He 
returned to the Soviet Union at the end of that year and took a seat in the Communist 
International.  Radek sided with Trotsky on the issue of more aggressive world revolution to 
advance communism, and his fall from Stalin’s good graces was complete with his arguments 
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against Stalin’s policies of forced collectivization and grain requisition.5  He remained in 
opposition to Stalin until his expulsion from the Party at the XV Party Congress in 1927.  He 
capitulated and rejoined the CPSU in 1930 and took over as editor of the state-run newspaper 
Izvestia.  Radek was also one of the writers of the 1936 Soviet Constitution and enjoyed his 
respected status and posts until his arrest and the January 1937 trial. 
 The charges were similar to those of 1936, and the prosecution proclaimed “that on the 
instructions of L. D. Trotsky there was organized in 1933 a parallel center consisting of the 
following accused in the present case…the object of which was to direct criminal, anti-Soviet, 
espionage, diversive and terrorist activities…”6 Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov, and Serebryakov 
were the leaders of the group, while the rest undertook wrecking and sabotage in major sectors of 
industry including chemical, coal, and railroad.  The group was called the “reserve center” 
according to the prosecution, as they would take over in the event of failure by Zinoviev and 
Kamenev.  Credible or not, the court found all the defendants guilty and thirteen of the seventeen 
men received the death penalty.  Stroilov faced eight years in prison, while Radek, Sokolnikov, 
and Arnold found themselves with ten years.7 
One major reason such strong reaction emerged in 1937 was because of the names on 
trial and the large number more implicated in conspiracies due to the testimony of the accused.  
Radek was well known around the world, especially by foreign journalists.  As the editor of 
Izvestia and a member of the Comintern, he knew many members of the Western press, and they 
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often saw him as a good friend.8  One such person was Walter Duranty, a writer for the New 
York Times and an observer of the trial.  Radek’s testimony and interrogation by the prosecution 
inspired Duranty:  “Under the shadow of certain death it was a clear and brave performance, but 
it burned my heart to watch my friend Radek utter th  words…that tied the noose around his own 
neck.”  According to Duranty, “Radek taught me so much and helped me so often—how could I 
believe him guilty until I heard him say so?”9 The American journalist eventually won a Pulitzer 
Prize for his works on Russia, but he maintained a close relationship with Stalin’s government.  
Such a close tie led to complaints about Duranty’s pro-Russian bias and the call for revocation of 
his Pulitzer.  Thus, while he seemed upset over his friend’s predicament, Radek’s confession of 
guilt was sufficient for Duranty to sustain a fondness for Stalin. 
 Radek was not the only one who took the stand and h d supporters in the United States.  
Vladimir Romm, once a Washington correspondent for Izvestia, testified that he ferried letters 
between Radek and Trotsky and reported to Trotsky on what he knew from his sources in the 
West.  Upon hearing this startling news, a number of American journalists called for 
Ambassador Joseph Davies to appeal to the Soviet Unon o  Romm’s behalf.  They could not 
understand why a man of such integrity would face this grave situation:  “In our dealings with 
Romm we found him a true friend and advocate of the USSR.  Never once did he even faintly 
indicate lack of sympathy for or disloyalty toward the existing government.  He did more than 
any other Soviet envoy to popularize the Stalin regim  in this country.”10 The decision to place 
                                                
8 It is possible that Radek’s relationship with the W st saved him from death, at least temporarily.  Stalin 
may have believed testimony from Radek would hold a great deal of credibility, and his execution would serve only 
to anger the West.  See Warren Lerner’s Karl Radek (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1970) and Arkady 
Vaksberg’s Stalin’s Prosecutor (New York:  Grove Weidenfeld, 1990). 
9 Walter Duranty, “Radek Wins Tilt of Wits at Trial,” p. 3. 
10 “American Writers Attempt to Save Romm,” New York Times, January 24, 1937, p. 28. 
 44
Romm in the courtroom was clearly not a positive move n Stalin’s part if he intended to 
improve relations with the West. 
 The Radek-Pyatakov trial was more a part of the int rnational events occurring at the 
time than was the first trial.  This can be explained in more than one way.  First, the 
prosecution’s charges involved many complex plots that needed assistance from both Germany 
and Japan, in which the rewards to these nations allegedly would be the ceding of Soviet territory 
that would help in the event of a coming war in Europe, or in Japan’s case, against the United 
States.  Second, the growing tensions in Europe, Asia, and America made it difficult for 
observers to view the trial in any other way than as a contribution to the chaos occurring around 
the world. 
 By 1937, the situation in Spain had taken a downturn for the Soviet Union.  Fascist forces 
were slowly overtaking the country, and aid sent by Stalin started to die down.11  At this point, 
he could only hope to prolong the fighting there in order to hold off the possibility of Hitler’s 
aggression heading east.  The trials indicated Stalin’s worry over losing power from both internal 
and external forces, but many also criticized Stalin for his timing.  George Kennan pointed out 
that “the decision to intervene militarily in the Spanish Civil War coincided almost to the day 
with the high point” of the crisis of dissent amongst Party members and the purges.12 Kennan 
believed Stalin had underestimated Hitler in earlier years and received a great deal of criticism 
for it.  As a result, Stalin created the 1937 trial in order to remove opposition and obstacles to 
preparation for possible war with Germany.  By indicating a threat from both East and West 
                                                
11 For the past year, the Nationalist Army held the upper hand, allowing both Germany and Italy to reject 
British and French proposals of non-intervention.  Fascist aid increased drastically while other nations squabbled 
over how to handle the war in Spain.  Because the Soviet Union received no assistance from major Western nations, 
it was impossible to keep up what the country saw as a key part of stopping fascism and accelerating world 
revolution.  Timeline of events taken from Gabriel Jackson’s The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1965). 
12 George Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941 (Princeton:  D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1960), 
p. 90. 
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especially in the 1937 trial, Stalin was making sure “at least that the rest of the capitalist world 
would not join or acquiesce in such an aggression.”13 
 Kennan, who attended both the 1936 and 1937 trials, emained extremely critical after his 
firsthand viewing of the courtroom scenario in 1936.  In addition to his indictment of Stalin’s 
reasoning for holding another trial, he argued against the credibility of the trial itself.  He 
questioned how much good Stalin could do by bringing more men to the stand and imprisoning 
the rest.  After listening to the defendants, Kennan w s unsure whether most of them had even 
seen each other before coming into the courtroom.  For eight hours a day over the course of a 
week, the men confessed in great detail, but the audience had the impression that each of them 
was “talking in symbols” and not actually coming forward with hard evidence to reinforce the 
charges. He lamented that those who did not wish to confess never appeared in court; rather, they 
were dealt with in other ways.  Kennan also heard rumors that Soviet police arrested Pyatakov’s 
wife even before Pyatakov himself went to prison.14 
 The chargé in the Soviet Union, Loy Henderson, did not hold as critical a view of the trial 
as Kennan, but recognized the Radek-Pyatakov situation s one that Stalin designed to send a 
message across the world that Trotsky should be considered an enemy by all.  In reporting back 
to the State Department, he claimed that Stalin becam  angered as the trials raised Trotsky’s 
prestige abroad.  When describing reactions to the trials, Henderson believed the peasants were 
“indifferent”, the workers were “cynical”, the bureaucracy was “in a panic”, and the 
                                                
13 Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 216. 
14 Memorandum by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in the Soviet Union, February 13, 1937,  Foreign 
Relations of the United States:  The Soviet Union 1933-1939 (Washington:  Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 
364.  Kennan never bought into the trials, and it did not help that Ambassador Joseph Davies rarely paid attention to 
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in his memoirs, said he tried to do his best to point ut Vyshinsky’s “thundering brutalities” and some of the 
“cringing confessions”, but instead Davies placed “considerable credence in the fantastic charges leveled at these 
unfortunate men” See George Kennan’s  Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston:  Little, Brown and Company, 1967, p. 83). 
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intelligentsia were “frightened”.15 If Stalin had hoped to gain international support f  the Soviet 
Union against fascism, his trials failed to attract key support from government officials in the 
West.  Instead, they attracted hesitation and uncertainty. 
 The second trial reflected Stalin’s growing anxiety about the Japanese threat.  The 
Imperial Army’s invasion and capture of Manchuria in 1931 and 1932 and the creation of the 
puppet state Manchukuo gave Stalin reason for worry.  A frantic rush to install policies of 
collectivization and industrialization prompted a Soviet declaration of neutrality in a Chinese-
Japanese conflict.  In the first half of the 1930s, “a war with Japan…might have resulted in more 
than disastrous military consequences in the Far East” and would have “shaken Communist 
power” badly.16 However, by the time of the Radek-Pyatakov trial the defendants began claiming 
that in exchange for economic and military assistance that would help weaken and remove Stalin 
from power, the Japanese would receive resource-rich Soviet territory in the East. 
 Americans also had reason to worry about Japanese aggr ssion and the possibility of the 
Japanese Army taking over resources due to Soviet concessions.  An article in the Chicago Daily 
Tribune published parts of a letter allegedly written by Trotsky, which laid out plans for handing 
over territory to Japan:  “Should Japan go to war with the United States…’invaluable’ 
concessions would be made to aid the Nipponese nation.  These were to include the rich oil 
resources of…Sakhalin Island.”17 The United States was suffering from economic depression 
and faced an ongoing debate on whether to participae n sending aid to nations fighting against 
fascism, and confessions from defendants in Stalin’s trial that indicated the possibility of a 
                                                
15 Memorandum from the Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, June 13, 1937, Foreign 
Relations of the United States:  The Soviet Union 1933-1939, p. 380. 
16 Harry Schwartz, Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars:  A History of Chinese-Russian Relations 
(Philadelphia:  J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964), p. 113. 
17 “17 Who Ruled in Russia Confess Plot to Ruin It,” p. 1. 
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Japanese-American conflict could only serve to plant the idea that Stalin’s government could be 
a valuable ally.18 
 Hitler’s and Mussolini’s increased aggression and ti-communist propaganda also 
helped Stalin’s argument that fascism was dangerous.  Communists around the world had already 
dedicated themselves for years to the end of fascism.  In the years before the trials, various 
governments composed of multiple, and often opposing, political parties had sprung up, most 
prominently in Spain and France in the form of Popular Front governments.    By 1937, however, 
“the Communists’ goal was no longer a Popular or People’s Front but a Democratic Front, a 
coalition of the forces opposed to the fascists’.”19 Stalin’s use of fascist agents as an unseen 
threat cleverly played on the valid fears of Americans and Europeans alike.  The official Soviet 
line was that communists needed to “mount a joint front against fascism” with the help of 
socialists and democrats alike, and the goal was for “containing the spread of fascism rather than 
of destroying its focal points…”20 Popular Front governments and foreign communist parties 
followed the Comintern’s line, which in the 1930s was the official policy of the Soviet Union, 
and thus a trial showing the possibility of eradicating fascist terrorism held a great deal of weight 
with such groups. 
 By this time, various countries around the world, including France, Great Britain, and the 
United States, were home to young and growing committees that attempted to defend Leon 
Trotsky.  The earliest ones proved the increasing dvide between support and criticism for the 
                                                
18 The Soviet Union had actually attempted for years to form a Non-Aggression Pact with Japan, beginning 
in the early 1920s.  After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Stalin attempted to remain neutral while 
verbally attacking the imperialistic and militaristic endencies of both the United States and Japan (Jacob Kovalio, 
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19 Harvey Klehr, Heyday of American Communism:  The Depression Decade (New York:  Basic Books, 
Inc., 1984), p. 207. 
20 Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 227. 
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trials and the Soviet regime.  Pro-Stalinists and Communists were not pleased with the pro-
Trotsky elements, and in the United States, “sixty prominent American intellectuals signed an 
open letter to liberals warning that the American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky had 
no interest in securing justice but was an instrument to attack and defame the Soviet Union.”21 
As in 1936, one can clearly see American Communist support for Stalin’s trials not necessarily 
based on their validity, but based instead on politics and ideology. 
 The largest commission and possibly one of the strongest and most important reactions to 
Stalin’s trials was the Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky in 
the Moscow Trials, or the Dewey Commission, which was formed in March 1937.  Headed by 
John Dewey, a prominent educator, author, and leader of progressive education reform in the 
United States, the Commission attempted to examine the charges brought against Trotsky and 
determine whether they were true or fantasy. Through t his life, Dewey consistently argued for 
economic and social freedoms and even toured schools in China and the Soviet Union in the 
early twentieth century.  His belief in democratic freedoms led him to argue against dictator 
regimes such as Stalin’s.  Thus when he had the opportunity to chair such a Commission, he took 
it.22  The Commission was especially important as it reflected the sentiment not only of the 
American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky, but also had support from similar groups 
in France, England, and even Czechoslovakia. 
 Dewey’s Commission used as much documentary material as was available at the time.  
The Soviet government refused to release the supposed preliminary hearings records as well as 
documentary evidence the defendants’ continually referr d to in the trial itself, so Dewey used 
                                                
21 Harvey Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, p. 360. 
22 In the Commission’s published report, Not Guilty, Dewey agreed to join because opposition to such 
policies by Communist parties in nations such as the Soviet Union and China only served to kill countless numbers, 
and in Spain such oppression had split the ranks of the working class. 
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published writings, records of other governments, personal archival material of Trotsky’s, press 
reports, telegrams, and any other hard proof he could find to prove Trotsky’s innocence.23  To 
address those who claimed the trials were valid because of their conformity to Soviet legal 
procedure, the Commission argued that “adherence to a given legal procedure is not the basic 
criterion in judging any trial…It is quite possible, as history has proved, for accused persons to 
be falsely convicted without departure from the letter of the law governing criminal trials.”24  It 
went on to criticize the trial’s witnesses, especially since each and every one of them was under 
arrest and in prison under guard as well.  What little documentary evidence the prosecution 
produced also had little bearing on actually determining the guilt of the defendants, and instead 
simply confirmed at most that the men may have at one point lived in another country or traveled 
outside of the Soviet Union. 
 The Dewey Commission extensively researched the charges and testimony of the 
defendants and managed to refute much of what they said.  For example, Pyatakov testified that 
he flew to Oslo in December 1935 to meet with Trotsky and discuss plans for Stalin’s downfall.  
However, a check with the Kjeller airport director “confirmed the fact that no foreign airplane 
landed at Kjeller Aviation Ground in December, 1935…he added that it was out of the question 
that any airplane could land at Kjeller without being observed.”25 Vladimir Romm stated that he 
met multiple times with Trotsky, who denied ever hearing of Romm until the January trial.  
Romm claimed he took letters from Radek to Trotsky as Trotsky moved across France in 1933.  
                                                
23 John Dewey was not actually a Trotskyist.  Despite criticism for seemingly defending Trotsky, “for John 
Dewey the obligation to tell the truth as a necessary constituent of a democratic polity took priority over the 
immediate, or distant, political consequences of any particular inquiry” (Alan Spitzer,  “John Dewey, the ‘Trial’ of 
Leon Trotsky and the Search for Historical Truth,” History and Theory, Volume 29, No. 1, February 1990, p. 35). 
He commented that most liberals believed Trotsky to be guilty simply because they disagreed with Trotsky’s 
policies, and if Dewey had not written so many prominent intellectual works, even in his seventies, hi ideas could 
have been dismissed as the work of a senile 78 year old man.  This of course was not the case. 
24 Not Guilty, p. 21. 
25 Not Guilty, p. 185. 
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However, the Commission believed “that one of the outstanding defects in the procedure of the 
January trial was the failure of the prosecution to pr duce the French police record of Trotsky’s 
movements…which it could presumably easily have obtained from the friendly government of 
France.26 At this time, France was working on possible military agreements with the Soviet 
Union and had no reason to withhold information that could confirm the prosecution’s 
accusations. 
 After its research was complete, the Dewey Commission tated, “On the basis of all the 
evidence we find that Trotsky never recommended, plotted, or attempted the restoration of 
capitalism in the U.S.S.R.  We therefore find the Moscow trials to be frame-ups…We therefore 
find Trotsky and Sedov not guilty.”27 After repeated requests by Trotsky for extradition  the 
Soviet Union and repeated denials by Stalin, the Commission became warier of Stalin’s 
intentions.  If Trotsky was genuinely guilty, there should be no reason for Stalin to deny putting 
him in front of the prosecution.  This was significant at the time because until the release of the 
Commission’s findings, nothing had really been published on a mass scale in the United States 
refuting Stalin’s trials.  The Dewey Commission greatly contributed to the growing debate over 
whether to trust the Soviet Union and Stalin’s claims of a Japanese and German threat against 
both Europe and America. 
 Members of the American Communist Party continued to assess the trials largely based 
on their effects on the world communist movement and its homeland, the Soviet Union.  Many 
figures in the Party did not agree with Trotsky’s views, but also did not necessarily fully support 
Stalin’s policies.28  The 1936 trial had caused a great deal of confusion over what Stalin was 
                                                
26 Not Guilty, p. 228. 
27 Not Guilty, p. xv. 
28 The group of American Communists led by Jay Lovestone, known as “Lovestoneites”, was known for 
their support of Bukharin, and as Alan Spitzer points out that they began to change tone when it becam clear that 
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planning, and 1937’s trial led to fear of a significant blow to the Soviet Union and communism.  
An unsigned editorial in The Workers Age argued that the trial severely impaired Soviet prestig .  
Trying and executing even more leading CPSU figures only proved that Stalin was incapable of 
dealing with opposition movements.  Instead of working with them and integrating them into the 
Party, Stalin was moving toward a more closed and ultimately tyrannical government.  The 
editors wondered, “How long can a regime be continued in which no one ever knows upon 
whom he can rely, in which men in high and responsible positions…can no longer be trusted?”29 
 However, the CPUSA continued to examine the differences in viewpoints of Trotsky and 
Stalin.  They consistently disagreed with Trotsky on such ideas as the nature of revolutionary 
movement—he could not convince the Americans that aggressiveness was the key to success—
and the use of force to remove opposition. Because of Trotsky’s ideology it appeared that Stalin 
had a valid argument for holding the trials.  Many felt that Trotsky preached “that the ruling 
group headed by Stalin represents a conservative, Thermidorian force opening the way for 
counterrevolution and capitalist restoration.”30 Again, one can see reference to the era of the 
French Revolution and the politics of change versus stability.  American Communists, however, 
disagreed with such a statement.  Despite some growing concern over the trials, the majority of 
CPUSA members continued to support Stalin in the beli f that he always kept the interests of a 
socialist revolution as top priority. 
 Because of Trotsky’s views, it was easy for CPUSA members to overlook aspects of the 
trials that did not seem completely credible.  Despit  inconsistencies in testimony and evidence, 
Communists still managed to approve of Stalin’s methods, mostly out of their distaste for 
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29 “The Moscow Trials:  An Editorial Statement,” The Workers Age, Volume 6, No. 8, February 20, 1937, 
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Trotsky:  “Discrepancies, contradictions, even sheer impossibilities in the charges and 
allegations of the two trials are not hard to find, but…there still remains a substantial bedrock of 
fact…”31 Lack of documentary evidence and falsified accounts of meetings and events, one 
would think, would frequently hurt Stalin’s cause.  Nonetheless, American Communist distaste 
for Trotsky, past trials, and even the Russian Civil War made it difficult to argue against the 
possibility that the Soviet government did have many e emies actively seeking to supplant the 
leaders of the world communist movement. 
 Despite this, how could workers around the world possibly maintain their faith in 
communism when its primary leaders allegedly engaged in sabotage against the Party in its 
homeland?  A second trial, for the editors of The Workers Age, only proved Stalin’s hypocrisy:  
“The policy of ‘bloodletting’ has reigned unchecked and, as Stalin warned in 1936, the base of 
party and Soviet leadership has been dangerously narrowed, to the great detriment to the 
foundation of the socialist regime.”32 For American Communists, the more trials there were, the 
more the power of communist ideology weakened. 
 Not surprisingly, the German diplomatic corps observing the trial rejected what it was 
seeing.  The constant charges of German assistance in espionage and assassination attempts as 
well as sabotage on behalf of German firms in Soviet coal mining regions made the trial seem 
like a farce.  Friedrich von der Schulenburg, the German ambassador to the Soviet Union, 
reported to the Foreign Ministry that the trial “lack[ed] concrete and convincing proofs,” and the 
confessions all sounded like inane inventions.33 
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Some argued that critics of Stalin’s trials did notunderstand Soviet legal procedure, but 
Schulenburg criticized the fact that Stalin’s system of justice made claims of sabotage difficult to 
accept.  The lack of physical evidence, defendants’ repeated acknowledgement of their guilt, and 
even the continuation of a trial after guilty pleas proved that the trial was “not of proceedings 
conducted according to [German] rules of criminal law.”34  
German feelings of superiority combined with conflicting political ideology to help make 
the trials contribute to the seemingly diminishing chance at Soviet-German cooperation or even 
tolerance.  Germans did take solace in the fact that the trials and purges indicated the Soviet 
Union was becoming more conservative and xenophobic.  German stability also provided better 
employment opportunities through rearmament than did similar fields in the Soviet Union.  The 
trials, therefore, proved the growing strength and effectiveness of Hitler’s Germany. 
 Still, some found the 1937 trial persuasive, using the same arguments that they had in 
1936.  Dudley Collard, for example, a British lawyer who attended the Radek-Pyatakov trial, 
argued that Stalin put the men on the stand not only t  remove opposition, but to advance 
socialism in one country.  Why would these men be charged instead of more important, higher 
ranked officials if Stalin only wanted to consolidate power?35 Collard argued that Soviet court 
procedure was stronger and more balanced than that of British courts.  In Great Britain, no 
testimony would have been given after a guilty plea.  He believed that in the Soviet Union 
continued presentation of charges and confession all wed court officials to determine the degree 
of guilt as well as the severity of sentences.  Such detail also seemed necessary because it 
provided the public with a better understanding of the issues.  Interestingly enough, however, 
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after explaining this, Collard failed to point out that the Soviet government controlled any media 
that Russian citizens had access to.  He also went on to complain that much of the British press 
distorted accounts of the trial, claiming “sensationalized descriptions” of the courtroom and 
testimony.36 It remains to be understood on what Collard based his praise for the public’s 
detailed knowledge of the trial. 
 As the 1930s progressed, the world moved closer to war.  In the West, fascist aggression 
in the form of Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy continued to grow more powerful and 
consequently more threatening to the rest of Europe.  In the East, Japanese military incursions 
onto the Chinese mainland caused worry in the United States.  Stuck in the middle was the 
Soviet Union under Stalin.  From October to November 1936, Italy, Germany and Japan 
completed what would come to be known as the Anti-Comintern Pact, directed at the Soviet 
Union, the Comintern, and the entire world communist movement.  Although it was essentially a 
mutual assistance pact, Stalin could not rule out the possibility of a war on two fronts.  In this 
context, the 1937 Radek-Pyatakov trial involved seventeen defendants who proceeded through 
confession to tell the story of a complex plot to bring down Stalin with the help of foreign 
powers, including Germany and Japan.  Unlike the 1936 trial, the message in the second trial was 
much more international in its nature.  Fascists were everywhere, and terrorism was very real.  
War would come to Europe and the United States whether nations had prepared or stood aside. 
 The problem for Stalin was that he did not receive growing support as he had hoped.  
Instead, criticism and skepticism grew.  The desperate situation for the Republican forces in 
Spain and the diminishing Soviet aid in the fight against Fascism made many, including George 
Kennan, question the Soviet Union’s ability to fight and remain politically and economically 
stable amidst a series of trials and executions that removed many high-ranking Party officials. 
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 Those few who did accept the charges in the 1937 trial, such as the American Communist 
Party, did not necessarily do so because of its credibility.  Communists around the world took 
policies from the Comintern, which Stalin directly controlled by 1937.  As a result, international 
communism remained dedicated to the containment of fascism, and CPUSA members believed 
that Stalin, not Trotsky, could make this happen because they saw Stalin was more exclusively 
dedicated to the advancement of socialist revolution.  Many of the arguments in support of the 
trial were the same as in 1936.  Men like Dudley Collard simply claimed that Western nations 
did not understand Soviet legal procedure.  In addition, Stalin was carrying out plans for 
socialism-in-one-country, not for the removal of opp sition. 
 Worldwide committees such as the Dewey Commission claimed the trial could not be 
credible, primarily because Stalin denied Trotsky’s requests to return to the Soviet Union and 
take the stand.  Confessions given by defendants also were not consistent with recorded 
documents, and many of the alleged meetings between Trotsky and his fellow conspirators could 
not have taken place.  The continued weakening of Soviet-German relations and the testimony 
that German spies were helping ruin Soviet industry onl  served to create a wider rift between 
the two nations, and Soviet-Japanese relations fared no better. 
 In an attempt to gain support for a war he argued was coming soon, Stalin managed 
through the trial not only to worsen relations with the Axis powers, but also to create even more 
doubt among nations such as Great Britain and the United States, on whom he would need to rely 
in the event of an attack from either the east or the west.  The problem was that in a world where 
the conflicting ideologies of fascism, communism, and democracy could not come to cooperate, 
Western nations began to doubt even more the Soviet Union’s ability to fight.  After two failed 
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attempts for support, Stalin would have one more chan e in 1938 to finalize plans for an 
oncoming world war. 
  
“MAY THIS TRIAL BE THE LAST SEVERE LESSON”:  STALIN SENDS ONE MORE 
MESSAGE TO THE WEST WITH THE 1938 TRIAL OF BUKHARIN AND OTHERS 
 
 Fear, arrests, and executions characterized the Sovi t Union in the mid-1930s.  After two 
publicized trials and the removal of top-ranking Red Army officials for alleged military 
conspiracy against Stalin and his government, it seemed there was little hope of a stable regime 
in Eastern Europe that could help stop German aggression.  The testimony in 1937 implicated 
many more of those who had not yet felt Stalin’s anger, and few were surprised when a third trial 
began on March 2, 1938.  The final Moscow trial was the most publicized of the three, and 
consequently the most criticized, despite Stalin’s efforts to prove an extensive, worldwide 
espionage plot involving sabotage and murder. 
 The trial, like the previous two, opened in the perfect place for a drama of such grand 
proportions, the Nobles Club in Moscow.  Harold Denny of the New York Times reported on 
“…a casually grim atmosphere in the trivial setting of the one-time supper room of the Nobles 
Club of Czarist days, now the House of Trade Unions, used for concerts, meetings, and trials.  
This room, with baby blue walls, topped by a frieze of dancing girls and lighted by frivolous 
crystal chandeliers…” was clearly chosen for a theatrical purpose as well as a symbolic purpose.1 
Stalin unsurprisingly wished to increase the chances a foreign audience would view the 
defendants as villains.  To do this, the crowd was “three hundred or so spectators who, apart 
from a few foreign diplomats and reporters, were mostly police employees posing as indignant 
citizens.”2 The environment was set, and as Stalin hoped, many—such as American ambassador 
Joseph Davies—felt they were watching a grand play rather than seeing the downfall of 
defendants on trial. 
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 By early 1938, a number of situations had changed in both Europe and Asia.  Renewed 
Japanese aggression in China threatened Soviet borders in the east, prompting a Sino-Soviet non-
aggression treaty in August 1937.  An accord between Chinese Communists and Nationalists 
slowed the Japanese advance across the mainland and allowed the Soviet government to turn its 
full attention to Adolf Hitler.  Throughout the 1930s, the Soviet Union and Germany had worked 
on trade negotiations to allow the exchange of industrial materials and even grain, but by 1938, 
cooperation on this matter had completely fallen through, especially as Stalin demanded more 
money from the German government.  In September 1937, Hitler had reaffirmed Germany’s 
right to lebensraum, which in this instance meant taking back the previously German-controlled 
territory in order to allow the country a better chance of survival by gaining more resources.  In 
November, Mussolini officially joined the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan and Germany and 
thus recognized Japan’s puppet government in the Chinese province of Manchuria.  The 
following month, Italy resigned from the League of Nations while Great Britain’s Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden confirmed British policy of patient waiting to see what was to happen 
on the European mainland.   
 In Spain, Germany and Italy continued to provide forces and materials while the rest of 
Europe worked to maintain non-intervention.  What little aid Stalin gave trickled to a stop, 
despite his continued criticism of France and Great Britain’s unwillingness to help.3  Despite the 
June 1937 British reinstatement of its obligation t come to the aid of France and Belgium in the 
event either nation faced an attack, the threat was growing on both sides of the Soviet Union, and 
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Stalin’s message to the world warning of coming warbecame clear through his March trial in 
1938. 
 The trial, known as the Case of the Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites, had the 
most diverse group of defendants facing a wide variety of charges, and the largest network of 
alleged international conspiracies.  Sergei Bessonov was Counselor of the Berlin Embassy.  
Mikhail Chernov, People’s Commissar (PC) of Agriculture, took the stand with Grigori Grinko, 
his Deputy PC, and Prokapy Zubarev, a worker in the same department.  Akmal Ikramov and 
Faizulla Khodjayev were prominent figures in the Communist Party of Uzbekistan.  Vladimir 
Ivanov was the PC of the Soviet Timber Industry andIsaac Zelensky was a member of the 
People’s Commissariat of Supply.  Vasili Sharangovich was the Byelorussian delegate to the 
Seventeenth Party Congress.  Ignaty Kazakov, Lev Levin, and Dmitrii Pletnev were physicians, 
and Levin personally attended to Lenin and Stalin.  Pavel Bulanov, Pyotr Kryuchkov, and 
Venyamin Maximov-Dikovsky were secretaries to various Party officials. 
 While the above-mentioned defendants held important positions, the rest of the men 
made the trial the international spectacle it eventually became.  Nikolai Krestinsky held a 
number of high Party posts.  He had been PC of Justice in 1917, PC of Finance from 1918 to 
1921, ambassador to Germany from 1921 to 1930, and Deputy PC of Foreign Affairs from 1930 
to 1937.  Kristian Rakovsky had been the Soviet ambassador to both Great Britain and France in 
the 1920s.  Arkady Rosengoltz was PC of Foreign Trade from 1930 to 1937 and was a diplomat 
in London.  Alexei Rykov held a number of posts for the Bolsheviks.  By 1917 he was elected to 
the Central Committee and later served as PC of the In erior and was an outspoken supporter of 
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Lenin’s New Economic Policy.  In the 1930s he was PC of Communications until the first trial in 
1936.4 
 The two most notable defendants of all were Genrikh Yagoda and Nikolai Bukharin.  
Yagoda, once the head of the People’s Commissariat of In ernal Affairs (NKVD), was a 
mastermind behind arrests, interrogations, and executions.  Because of his integral role in the 
interrogation process in the months before the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial that led to every 
defendant’s execution and his unwavering loyalty to Stalin, it was shocking that such a man 
would ever manage to anger the dictator, but Yagoda f und himself in prison for treason, 
replaced by Nikolai Yezhov.  Nikolai Bukharin had been writing essays and books on Marxism 
and its principles since the first decade of the twntieth century. Lenin read many of Bukharin’s 
works and celebrated the theories.  Bukharin had worked closely with Trotsky and continued to 
publish his ideas. After a brief exile he returned to Moscow and became a leading member of the 
Central Committee.  He strongly supported Lenin’s New Economic Policy and his ideas on 
socialism in one country became a foundation of Stalin’s policies in the 1930s.  Bukharin also 
worked in the Politburo and was the President of the Communist International.  He was one of 
the main writers of the celebrated 1936 Soviet Constitution, but clashed with Stalin over the idea 
of collectivization.  Bukharin felt that forced grain requisition would only anger the peasants and 
cause lower production rates.  Stalin subsequently xpelled him from the Politburo and the 
Comintern, but brought him back as the editor of the Soviet paper Izvestia until his arrest in 1937 
and the trial in 1938. 
                                                
4 General lists of defendants can be found in most wrks discussing the trial.  This particular list was 
compiled from Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites (Moscow:  
People’s Commissariat of Justice, 1938) and Stephen Cohen and Robert Tucker’s The Great Purge Trial (New 
York:  Grosset and Dunlap Publishers, 1965). 
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The charges were as varied as the defendants themselv s.  Krestinsky and Rosengoltz 
allegedly worked for both British and German intelligence, Chernov for the Germans, Grinko for 
the Germans and Poles, and Sharangovich for the Poles.  Rakovsky served as a British and 
Japanese spy, and Rosengoltz also wrecked for Japan as he “personally attempted to commit a 
terrorist act against Comrade Stalin.”5 Ikramov and Khodjayev supposedly weakened Uzbekistan 
for attack from the West.  Zelensky reportedly mixed nails and glass into food supplies.  Ivanov, 
Zubarev, and Bessonov participated in wrecking activities to weaken Soviet stability.  Kazakhov, 
Levin, and Pletnev, led by Yagoda, proceeded with “wrecking methods of treatment” which 
ultimately led to the death of both Soviet writer Maxim Gorky in 1936 and his son in 1935.6 
Bulanov, Kryuchkov, and Maximov-Dikovsky assisted in passing information among individuals 
involved in the plots.  Finally, Bukharin and Rykov were the minds behind the current set of 
conspiracies against Stalin and the Soviet Union.  In the end, the court sentenced eighteen of the 
men to death.  Bessonov received 15 years in prison, Rakovsky 20 years, and Pletnev 25 years.7 
The American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky once again came to the aid of 
the defendants as it criticized the very fact that ere was another trial.  Quoted in the N w York 
Times, the Committee argued “like its predecessors, this will not be a trial at all but a well 
rehearsed theatrical presentation based upon the ability of the G.P.U. to extort false ‘confessions’ 
from the actors in order to destroy, morally and physically, Stalin’s political opponents.”8 Based 
on the questionable evidence of the last two trials, the Committee assumed the 1938 trial would 
be no different. 
                                                
5 Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites, p. 796. 
6 Report of Court Proceedings, p. 797. 
7 While it may have been strange to some that the charges involved medical murders, it is likely that Stalin 
introduced them in the 1938 trial in order to lend credibility to the claim that important people in the Soviet Union 
really had been assassinated.  Besides Sergei Kirov, the previous two trials remained vague and never really dealt 
with actual deaths, just the plots and preparation.  See Robert McNeal’s Stalin, Man and Ruler (New York:  New 
York University Press, 1988). 
8 “New Soviet Trial Called ‘Frame-Up’,” New York Times, March 2, 1938, p. 14. 
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Of course this was not the only skeptical prediction of what the 1938 trial would be like.  
In Great Britain, The Times printed an editorial foretelling the coming events:  “The 
prisoners…will accuse themselves of all manner of sins…The proceedings will end with a 
sentence that is already a foregone conclusion, and the sequel for most of the victims will be a 
bullet in a prison corridor.”9 The inability of Great Britain and the Soviet Unio to cooperate 
more closely economically and militarily over the recent years caused many in Great Britain to 
view Stalin’s anti-fascist messages as statements tha  the Soviet Union had no more use for a 
possible alliance.  Instead, the country would take on fascism and imperialism on its own:  
“Stalin has explained that his conception of the future of Europe is preparation for a war to the 
death between two…dictatorships, and with such a confli t neither democrats nor workers for 
peace can have anything to do, except labour to prevent it.”10 
After the predictions, whether Stalin meant it or nt, the trial proceedings threw a curve 
to the audience and the world press.  As Harold Denny described, “[Nikolai] Krestinsky 
evidently intends to fight for his life.  His refusal to admit his guilt produced a sensation.”11 
Krestinsky claimed his earlier confession to investigators was false and that his break with 
Trotsky was final.  When asked by the prosecution why he would lie until taking the stand, 
Krestinsky claimed his words would never have been h ard otherwise.  The Chicago Daily 
Tribune printed a front-page article detailing both the all ged vast conspiracies and Krestinsky’s 
actions.  In fact, “until Krestinsky’s protestation f innocence the trial had followed the familiar 
lines of previous mass treason trials.”12 Amid the usual reinforcement of guilt and self-
incrimination, Krestinsky was “agitated to the point where he had to take a nerve tablet to steady 
                                                
9 “The Russian Trial,” The Times, March 2, 1938, p. 15. 
10 “The Russian Trial,” p. 15. 
11 Harold Denny, “Confession False, Soviet Aide Says; 20 Admit Charges,” p. 1.   
12 “Soviet Leader Defies Stalin; Jolts Spy Trial,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 3, 1938, p. 6. 
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himself,” and “he called his accusers among the defndants liars and they in turn hurled the 
epithet back at him.”13 By the next session, however, Krestinsky returned to the point of view 
that he really was guilty of sabotage and espionage.   
While this unusual shake-up broke from the normal course of one of Stalin’s show trials, 
this surprising event was not enough to make the trial convincing in Great Britain—the 
testimony still sounded rehearsed.  According to the testimony of Khodjayev and Ikramov, 
“Britain was therefore to be given either the whole r a part of Uzbekistan” for its assistance, 
along with Germany and Japan, in bringing down Stalin’s regime.14 For Stalin to compare Great 
Britain to the two aggressor nations, one can infer he had given up hope for an alliance with 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.  One could also suggest, however, that this was a play by 
Stalin to gain favor or at least recognition from Hitler, whose acceptance of a pact would come 
just over one year later.15 
The Economist had continued printing anti-Soviet articles and now had more reason to do 
so with the onset of the 1938 trial.  The editors’ bitterness was rarely concealed as its anti-
Bolshevik stance held through all three trials, andthey claimed Stalin “demonstrated…contempt 
for the…democratic notion of justice.”16  After Krestinsky claimed his innocence and then 
retracted his statements, the publication maintained “outside the Russian borders [the trials] 
serve only to sicken and disgust the friends of Russia and delight her enemies.”17 It even 
compared Soviet justice to Nazi courts and found that even though defendants shared similar 
                                                
13 “Soviet Leader Defies Stalin; Jolts Spy Trial,” p. 6. 
14 “Moscow Trial Indictment,” The Times, March 3, 1938, p. 13. 
15 It remains unclear whether Krestinsky genuinely repudiated the charges or if it was set up.  After his 
revelation, court was adjourned for the day, and upon his return in the evening Krestinsky claimed it had been his 
health keeping him from telling the whole truth.  He had become depressed and aggravated when the charg s were 
read.  His final declaration of guilt could have come from either shame, or from Stalin. See Dmitri Volkogonov’s 
Stalin:  Triumph and Tragedy (New York:  Grove Weidenfeld, 1988). 
16 “Dictators’ Justice,” The Economist, Vol. CXXX No. 4932, March 5, 1938, p. 494. 
17 “Dictators’ Justice,” p. 494. 
 64
grim fates in both countries, the Nazis at least produced the illusion of a fair trial, including 
allowing pleas of not guilty and shorter prison sentences. 
The charges that men like Rakovsky served British intell gence and relayed information 
back to Great Britain about possible weakness in Stalin’s regime naturally did not sit well with 
the British government.  Earlier trials had already presented the possibility of British help in 
bringing down the Soviet Union, but Anglo-Soviet relations had been shaky for over a decade by 
1938.  In the late 1920s the British government contained men who fought in the Russian Civil 
War with Denikin and the Whites, and a severing of diplomatic ties with Russia would mean 
little, especially as the move could be a “stepping-stone” to “a war against the Bolsheviks.”18 
The Chinese seizure of British possessions in 1927 destroyed the theory that relations with 
Russia would stop Chinese aggression, and there seemed to be little reason to continue talks. 
Parliament finally decided in May 1927 to end “recognition” of the Soviet Union, despite 
the fact that trade and other economic relations remained.  A change in this policy would not 
come for years “because of inertia and because old men regard the reversal of a mistaken action 
injurious to their prestige.”19 Immediately after the break British officials attempted to urge other 
European nations, including Germany, to follow suit, but this never happened as “Soviet-German 
friendship lay embedded in a common antagonism to the Versailles system.”20 The shaky 
relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union through the 1920s and into the 1930s likely 
left Stalin with the idea that it would be easier and more practical to improve relations with 
Hitler rather than Chamberlain. 
                                                
18 Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs (New York:  Vintage Books, 1960), p. 500. 
19 Louis Fischer, The Soviet in World Affairs, p. 510. 
20 Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, p. 514. 
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The accusations against British agents spurred reaction from the highest officials in 
London, including Chamberlain himself.  Especially fter feeling pressure from the Labour 
Party, Chamberlain gave an official statement in fro t of the House of Commons: 
I feel I need hardly assure the House that the governm nt has not been guilty of 
any breach in its agreement with the Soviet Union and has not employed any of 
those whose names have been mentioned to work for the British intelligence 
service or to engage in any subversive activities against the Soviet government.21 
 
By this time, Chamberlain had begun his policy of appeasement, an attempt to preserve peace by 
allowing Hitler certain concessions, including territory and increasing arms production.  Not only 
did this annoy some of his fellow countrymen, but also Stalin was not pleased, and according to 
the Soviet ambassador to London in February 1938, “insofar as foreign affairs were concerned 
Chamberlain produced the impression of innocence bordering on idiocy.”22 British politicians 
were stuck in the difficult position of accepting Chamberlain’s policy of inaction or speaking out 
and risking the chance of being branded as fascist. 
 American Communists had to continue dealing with the increasing criticism of Stalin and 
Communism.  Earl Browder, one of the most prominent figures of the CPUSA, argued that none 
of what was happening was that different from events i  America’s own past.  Browder, the head 
of the CPUSA and its presidential nominee in both 1936 and 1940, argued throughout the 1930s 
and 1940s that the United States and the Soviet Union could cooperate on many issues and in the 
1940s stated that the ideologies of communism and cpitalism could work together, which 
earned him removal from his post in the Party.  In 1938, he believed American history had 
parallels that proved the existence of traitors.  After comparing Abraham Lincoln’s assassination 
                                                
21 “Chamberlain Denies Link To Any Russians on Trial,” New York Times, March 19, 1938, p. 1. 
22 Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence:  Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73 (New York:  Holt, Rinehart, 
and Winston, Inc., 1974), p. 251.  Interestingly, before Neville Henderson left to his post as British Ambassador to 
Germany, he strongly urged Chamberlain that “British rearmament should be relentlessly pursued, since no 
argument could count with the government of Hitler except that of force.”  Chamberlain indicated that t is too was 
his intention, but he instead took a much more conciliatory path.  See Neville Henderson’s memoirs Failure of a 
Mission:  Berlin 1937-1939 (New York:  G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940), p. 8. 
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to Sergei Kirov’s murder, Browder pointed out that it was “treason in the American Army that 
opened up…Washington to the British Army” so many years ago.23 The overthrow of an old 
order by revolutionary forces also happened not only in the Soviet Union, but also in the United 
States.  For Browder, the Moscow trials and similarit es in American history showed “the full 
scope and extent of the international conspiracy” and thus this was “not to be considered the 
domestic affair of the land of socialism.”24 Browder never mentioned the presence of similar 
trials in America’s past, but the continual presence of traitors and unseen enemies led him to 
believe that it was unwise to automatically discredit the charges brought upon the defendants in 
Stalin’s trials. 
 As with previous trials, CPUSA members focused on b th political ideology and 
revolution.  The protection of communism from fascism was the topic of discussion for most of 
the Party publications at the time.  Like Browder, Joseph Starobin drew parallels between the 
American and Russian Revolutions, pointing out such traitors as Benedict Arnold and Aaron 
Burr, who tried to prevent the overthrow of the oldr er.  Starobin, who grew up among 
socialists in New York and became a journalist for the Party at a young age, believed that “the 
trials have struck a blow for world peace.  They have eliminated agents of corruption and 
treachery within the Soviet Union, on whom the fascist  counted heavily.”25  He stressed that 
Hitler saw the importance of this, and “…shoved the headlines on the trial to the back page by 
his invasion of Austria.”26 It was clear to Starobin that the Axis powers would not be satisfied 
until the world was theirs. 
                                                
23 Earl Browder, Traitors in American History:  Lessons of the Moscow Trials (New York:  Workers 
Library Publishers, 1938), p. 10. 
24 Earl Browder, Traitors in American History, p. 3. 
25 Joseph Starobin, “The Moscow Trial:  Its Meaning ad Importance,” Young Communist Review, Vol 3, 
No. 2, April 1938, p. 16. 
26 Joseph Starobin, “The Moscow Trial:  Its Meaning ad Importance,” p. 16. 
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 While some American Communists hailed Stalin’s protection of revolution, other leftist 
political figures were getting fed up at the continual death under Stalin’s rule.  Norman Thomas, 
a periodic Socialist Party presidential candidate, was one such person.  Thomas had previously 
hailed the coming of the Russian Revolution, but later turned to anti-Communism and anti-war 
convictions.  He criticized Stalin as a man who, rather than working with the international 
communist community, was threatening the entire socialist movement through the trials and his 
so-called socialism-in-one-country plan.  Thomas referenced history, but unlike others who 
compared the Soviet Union to revolutionary France, he lamented “under the Spanish Inquisition 
and the witchcraft trials similar false confessions were made.”27 Earlier Socialists and 
Communists realized that some of the charges were hard to believe, but it had always been for 
the good of revolution.  By 1938, Thomas argued the trials were for Stalin’s personal benefit.  He 
was covering himself due to a failure of foreign policy.  In fact, Thomas ended up making a 
haunting observation: 
Obviously [Stalin] has abandoned his hope of an understanding with Great 
Britain…Otherwise Great Britain would not be so frequ ntly mentioned in the 
trials.  The French alliance is breaking down; the Popular Front is dissolving…I 
think it might well be an alliance or understanding with Hitler were it not, first, 
that I think Hitler…would refuse it and…that Stalin has perhaps publicized Hitler 
too largely as the enemy in Russia.28 
 
 Joseph Davies, American ambassador to the Soviet Un on, attended Bukharin’s trial as 
well.  While he had George Kennan with him as a transl tor, he frequently relied on the 
American press and other ambassadors as interpreters, which greatly annoyed Kennan.  Davies 
felt sympathy for the men on trial, but like so many others believed that confessions alone 
proved that the defendants were guilty, and that a plot did exist to overthrow the government.29 
                                                
27 Norman Thomas, “The Moscow Trials,” The Modern Monthly, Vol 10 No. 11, March 1938, p. 4. 
28 Norman Thomas, “The Moscow Trials,” p. 13. 
29 Joseph Davies, Mission to Moscow (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1941), p. 262. 
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 There was a problem with the trial coverage Davies provided, however.  Upon his arrival 
in the Soviet Union, Stalin gave him the royal treament and spared no expense in exposing 
Davies to Soviet art and culture.  This was exactly what the ambassador and his wife wanted.  
The majority of Davies’ memoirs detail the experienc s he had at the opera and discussing 
various issues with acquaintances in relaxed enviroments.  His passing descriptions of the trials 
often could have been mistaken for a play he saw the night before, which showed that Stalin was 
successful in his endeavor at least to a certain degree.  The defendants were neatly dressed, 
guarded by soldiers with fixed bayonets.  The air of the courtroom was calm and lacked passion, 
according to Davies.  While he was more interested in art than politics, his descriptions prove 
that at least some of those following the trials believ d what Stalin wanted them to.30 
 Chinese Communists identified with the trials much more than American Communists.  
Defendants in Moscow talked of plots to open the Soviet Union to foreign aggression and control 
while undermining resistance to such actions.  A New York Times correspondent in China 
reported that Chinese Communist publications claimed Trotskyites, after assisting the Japanese 
with the Soviet Union, would help in the conquest of China.  One paper praised Stalin and the 
Soviet Union for openly pursuing Japanese and German agents, claiming “this shows Russia is 
not afraid of her enemies.”31 
                                                
30 Davies was likely a refreshing change for Stalin, whose attempts to court Davies’ predecessor ultimately 
failed.  William Bullitt, whom Stalin provided with a similar lifestyle, became outspoken against the Soviet 
government.  He did not like Maxim Litvinov, his Soviet counterpart, and his assessment of the Comintern was that 
it was urging class agitation in the United States.  His continued disagreements with Litvinov led to w rsening living 
conditions for Bullitt, and Bullitt wanted Franklin Roosevelt to publicly accuse the Soviet Union of pl tting to 
overthrow American democracy.  He believed Stalin also wanted European war that would promote revolutin.  By 
1936, Bullitt and Soviet officials could not work together at all and Bullitt took up a new position in France.  George 
Kennan gained a great deal of knowledge about the Soviet Union from Bullitt’s experiences, while Davies clearly 
did not.  See Beatrice Farnsworth’s William C. Bullitt and the Soviet Union (Bloomington:  Indiana University 
Press, 1967).  Thomas Maddux argues that American diplomats such as Davies did underestimate Stalin’s me sages 
to the West, and as a result did not understand that new talks could keep Stalin away from Hitler See Years of 
Estrangement:  American Relations with the Soviet Union, 1933-1941 (Tallahassee:  University Press of Florida, 
1980), p. 45. 
31 “Sees a Plot in China,” New York Times, March 5, 1938, p. 8. 
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 While the verdicts were not particularly surprising to anyone who knew of the previous 
trials, it was still disturbing that a respected man such as Nikolai Bukharin could fall so far out of 
favor that he earned himself a death sentence.  He had realized by the second trial that when his 
name came up in confessions, he, too, would likely face a similar fate as all the other defendants.  
Bukharin recognized that a sense of impending fate and desperate attempts to clear one’s name 
only contributed to a mental breakdown that made confessions easier to give, whether they were 
true or not.  Bukharin made his wife, Anna Larina, memorize his Testament so when she left the 
country, she could reproduce and distribute his ownversion of events.  Bukharin sadly suggested 
“my head alone, guilty of nothing, will implicate thousands more of the innocent.”32 Bukharin’s 
execution came on March 15, 1938, interestingly onl days after the Anschluss, Hitler’s 
annexation of Austria for the Germans.  It is unclear whether Stalin purposely timed the 
execution in such a way as to downplay Bukharin’s death. 
 With the continued and increasing aggression of Japan, Germany, and eventually Italy, 
Stalin appeared to feel the Soviet Union was constantly under the threat of war and invasion.  
After repeated, but only partially successful attempts at military and economic cooperation with 
countries such as France and Great Britain, he sought other approaches to security.  This was 
evident through the charges brought upon the defendants in the 1938 trial.  Not only were 
defendants charged as agents for Germany and Japan, but also for countries such as Poland and 
Great Britain who were alleged to have spies and saboteurs working toward the downfall of the 
Soviet Union.  Adding British agents to the list of accused indicated Stalin’s reluctance to 
continue negotiations with Chamberlain, and suggests that his contemplated turn toward a pact 
with Hitler could be dated to March 1938. 
                                                
32 Anna Larina, This I Cannot Forget (New York:  W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), p. 344. 
 70
 As a result, criticism became even harsher, especially in Great Britain where most British 
citizens were fed up with both Stalin and their own Prime Minister.  Newspapers predicted how 
the trial would play out—just like the last two—and for the most part they were correct.  
Whether Stalin meant for Nikolai Krestinsky to deny his guilt in the courtroom remains unclear, 
but even with the unorthodox situation critics remained unconvinced of the trial’s validity. 
 Those who remained loyal to the Communist cause often did so out of respect for the 
advancement of the ideology and the hope of a coming revolution.  American Communists 
continued to accept Stalin as the best choice for the world communist movement regardless of 
the validity of the charges against each defendant in the trial.  Earl Browder went so far as to 
claim that the trial only uncovered a plot similar to what Americans faced so many years ago 
when fighting off the British.  For Browder, terror was always present, and like the assassination 
of Abraham Lincoln, the Soviet authorities had to deal with the murder of Sergei Kirov.  It 
clearly did not help American understanding of the trial by having Joseph Davies present.  Stalin 
understood the importance of keeping the American ambassador happy through the presentation 
of Soviet art and culture, which Davies fully enjoyed.  Chinese Communists, on the other hand, 
faced possible decimation at the hands of both Nation l st factions and the Japanese army, and 
consequently supported Stalin’s endeavor to uncover and destroy Trotskyist elements working to 
undermine the Communist cause.  Thus, by 1938 those who praised Stalin for his decisions 
realized the possibility of conspiracy, not necessarily the reality, which led to the increasing 
debate about cooperation with the Soviet Union during this time. 
   
  
A FAILED REQUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE:  AN ASSESSMENT OF 
JOSEPH STALIN’S MOSCOW TRIALS 
 
 
 Through the 1930s, Joseph Stalin’s Great Terror involved the arrest, torture, 
imprisonment, and death of countless millions.  It affected both urban areas and the countryside 
as Soviet citizens coped with living in an environment of constant fear.  Neighbor turned against 
neighbor as individuals desperately worked to avoid labor camps and death.  The primary 
characteristic of the Terror was the trial.  Peasants d workers alike had the opportunity to 
report any possible subversive activities they might have witnessed, and the accused faced courts 
composed of both Soviet authorities and peers.  No trials, however, were bigger than the three 
put on by Stalin in Moscow in 1936, 1937, and 1938.  In these three, high ranking Communist 
Party officials faced charges of espionage, sabotage, wrecking, and terrorism as they allegedly 
attempted to bring down Stalin’s regime, at times with the help of foreign agents.  While Stalin’s 
plans for himself and the Soviet Union may never be fully clear, it is necessary to discuss first 
why he held the trials. 
 Historians consistently disagree on such an issue.  Many argue that the trials served 
simply to remove any possible opposition to Stalin’s power.  After Lenin’s death, the ensuing 
power struggle led to factionalism within the CPSU, and because Stalin held such high posts, he 
managed to come out ahead of such rivals as Leon Trtsky, Grigori Zinoviev, and Lev Kamenev.  
After the failure of his collectivization policy and the slow growth of industry, the criticism 
Stalin received only served to anger him into removing the skeptics.  Discussion of political 
change constantly “provided material for Stalin’s su picious mind” and as a result left him with 
many possible enemies.1 This, however, is not the complete picture.  While Stalin was definitely 
                                                
1 Robert Thurston, Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1934-1941 (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 
1996), p. 26.  The portrayal of Stalin as vindictive and paranoid is, unsurprisingly, the most common occurrence 
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the type of leader to blame and imprison others seemingly on a whim, there is more to his trials 
than merely the removal of opposition.  Fewer histor ans point out that Stalin also put on these 
trials for an international audience. 
 It is important to understand the major crises of the 1930s in order to make an argument 
for the international intentions of Stalin’s trials.  The Great Depression continued to destroy 
economies and politics across the world and as such, new ideologies emerged that seemed to 
have the solution.  In Italy, Benito Mussolini’s Fascist party had total control over every aspect 
of the lives of the citizens, and in Germany Adolf Hitler could claim much the same.  Despite the 
negatives of a totalitarian state, a willingness to increase arms production and take additional 
territory for necessary resources was slowly pulling Germany out of depression.  To compound 
the problem, the wait-and-see attitude adopted by Great Britain under Neville Chamberlain 
proved to other nations, especially the Soviet Union, that Europe and the United States were 
unwilling to deal with the fascist aggression.  The conflicting ideologies of fascism and 
communism naturally caused Stalin to worry that eventually Hitler would turn to the east and 
threaten Soviet borders. 
 The Japanese desire for resources and territory on the Chinese mainland led to military 
incursions that ended in brutality and death for the Chinese population.  In response, the United 
States placed economic sanctions on the Japanese, only angering them further.  The Soviet Union 
controlled much of the resource-rich territory on the Asian mainland, however.  Because of this, 
Stalin saw a clear danger from both Europe and Asia.  He risked facing an attack on two fronts, 
one that would be nearly impossible to defend against in the long run. 
                                                                                                                                                
among biographies of the leader.  Isaac Deutscher’s Stalin: A Political Biography (New York:  Oxford University 
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 Thus, Stalin had to prepare for the possibility of an upcoming war.  In his eyes, it would 
be ideologically motivated and would involve many nations.  While he wished for the 
advancement of socialism within the Soviet Union, the Comintern worked tirelessly to foment 
revolution across the rest of the world.  Despite Stalin’s wariness of capitalist encirclement, he 
realized the need for aid from such nations as Great Britain, France, and if possible, the United 
States.  The containment—not necessarily the eradication—of fascism became the top priority of 
the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.  The trials became, for Stalin, an opportunity to send a 
message not only to the populace at home, but also to the rest of the world.  This then explains 
why the trials ended up as “show trials”. 
 The concept of a staged trial was not a new one.  As far back as witchcraft trials and the 
Inquisition of the Middle Ages, accused were forced to confess their sins, whether they had 
actually sinned or not.  The public received the message that the ruling authority wished through 
such confessions and consequently fell into line, much of the time through the fear of being in 
the situation of the unfortunate accused.  The timing, setting, and procedure of a show trial were 
critical to its success, which could often be measured by audience reaction. 
 Stalin first set the environment for his trials and held them in the Nobles Club in 
Moscow.  This was clearly symbolic as the hall originally served as a reception and dance hall 
for the nobility of the tsarist regime.  The Club played host not only to trials and balls, but also to 
orchestras and theater.  The setting was perfect not only for its theatrical aspects, but also as an 
indication that the old regime was gone, and in its place was something new and more powerful.  
The hall held around 300, and most of the crowd consisted of strategically planted workers and 
law officials that could react to confessions and speeches accordingly. 
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 The confessions themselves were as close to theater as hey were to court.  Defendants, 
often enthusiastically, took the stand to denounce each other and their plans and praise the 
current regime in its ability to detect terrorists and maintain power.  Some discussed sabotaging 
railroads and factories while others allegedly met with Trotsky himself and relayed letters and 
memos to others in the terrorist group.  Most important, though, were the claims that the 
defendants had help from foreign agents.  In 1936, there was limited mention of Germany and 
the Gestapo, but by 1937 the Japanese became involved and in 1938, British and even Polish 
agents supposedly worked for the downfall of Stalin. 
 Stalin’s mention of these specific countries was obvi usly no fluke during this time 
period.  Germany’s reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 and the creation of the Anti-
Comintern Pact at the end of 1937 were perfect reasons for Stalin to make the point in his trials 
that fascist aggression and terrorism was present ev rywhere, not just in the Soviet Union, and 
anyone could be involved.  Great Britain likely became a target by the last trial because of the 
inability of the two nations to come to agreement over the nature of economic and military 
cooperation, and Chamberlain’s passivity toward Hitler left Stalin frustrated.  At the outbreak of 
the Civil War in Spain at the same time as the 1936 trial, the Soviet Union was the only country 
willing to send direct aid to the Republican forces, and the French and British decision for 
nonintervention proved to Stalin that the West needed to be convinced of danger. 
 The problem with Stalin’s trials was that the multiple crises occurring in the 1930s that 
he used in an attempt to strengthen cooperation with the West were the same events that led to 
growing criticism of the Soviet system.  In the United States, a great debate raged over whether 
to assist European nations against fascism.  President Roosevelt pushed for Congress to approve 
sending money and materials to Great Britain, while many in America argued that isolationism 
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was the only way to protect the country from becoming involved in future wars that would take 
place across the ocean.  In addition, why deal withEurope when Japan presented more of an 
immediate threat?  Japan had threatened retribution in the past when the United States stopped 
sending necessary resources such as oil, but it was still difficult to believe full-scale war was at 
hand. 
 In France, Leon Blum’s Popular Front government was failing.  Forming a broad 
coalition of political parties in order to contain fascism was unsuccessful.  Blum realized he 
needed the help of the Soviet Union to create the possibility of resisting Germany on two fronts.  
However, in Great Britain, Chamberlain looked less than favorably upon the Bolsheviks.  It 
came down to choosing between the lesser of two evils:  fascism or communism.  While military 
alliances were necessary, how could the arrest and execution of countless numbers really be the 
answer to strengthening a nation?  The United States could only give Great Britain limited aid, 
and thus Chamberlain’s appeasement of Germany continued.  Blum, afraid to upset his British 
ally, could do nothing to advance Franco-Soviet relations. 
 International communist movements took their orders from the Comintern, which 
answered to Stalin.  Groups such as the American Communist Party (CPUSA) dedicated their 
time to preventing the spread of fascism, and recognized the trials as helping do just that.  
However, world revolution needed more than just anti-fascist tendencies.  By 1938, many 
Communist writers acknowledged that charges against the defendants hardly seemed credible, 
but it was a matter of advancing revolution by that point.  Stalin, not Trotsky, seemed more 
capable of strengthening Communism.  This was as good a reason as any to accept the trials, 
mainly because Stalin’s policies changed so frequently a d foreign Communist parties had 
grown confused over just what they should be doing. 
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 Journalists and newspapers around the world criticized Stalin’s trials based on 
international events as well.  Many British publicat ons, such as The Times and The Economist 
remembered all too well the trials of the 1920s in which British workers allegedly helped 
sabotage Soviet industry.  Bitterness over the past combined with distaste for communist 
ideology in general, and newspapers denied the trials’ credibility, frequently printing Trotsky’s 
responses after covering the daily events of the courtroom.  The argument  arose that Hitler’s 
Germany was, in fact, more desirable than Stalin’s Soviet Union.  At least in Germany the 
judicial process allowed defense of the accused as well as dissenting opinion from the 
defendants.  If anyone was aggressive enough to start full-scale warfare, for many Stalin was the 
more likely candidate. 
 Readers of American newspapers had conflicting experiences.  While periodicals such as 
the Chicago Daily Tribune discussed the threat of war and allegations that Japan would receive 
resources and territory in exchange for helping bring down Stalin, the New York Times took a 
slightly different view.  Journalists Harold Denny and Walter Duranty became enchanted with 
the Soviet Union, and Duranty enjoyed the luxuries Stalin provided him during his time in the 
country.  As a result, he accepted the confessions of the defendants as the only necessary proof 
of guilt. 
 Stalin planned his trials in order to send out a message in theatrical form.  While some 
like Duranty and American ambassador Joseph Davies enjoyed the drama and recognized the 
play-like atmosphere of the trials, for so many more the self-incrimination and adulation of the 
Soviet regime was too much to handle.  After 1938, it was as though the world had gone through 
the same play three times, and so many hated to see the dreadful events unfold.  As soon as the 
list of defendants came out, not one follower of the trials expected anything but a death sentence 
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for each man.  The criticism increased, and by 1938 it seemed clear to Stalin that he would not 
receive support from the West. 
 Notable historians such as Stephen Cohen argue that the trials were an indication of 
Stalin’s turn toward possible alliance with Hitler.  This is not out of the realm of possibility, 
especially with other nations’ lack of cooperation.  Self-preservation of both leader and country 
was a constant theme of Joseph Stalin’s throughout is rule.  If he could not contain Fascist and 
Japanese aggression with the help of others, why not come to an agreement with the enemy?2 
Stalin may not have believed this was a permanent solu ion, but at the very least it could give 
him time to industrialize and mobilize the Soviet military. 
 In the 1930s Stalin and his communist followers appeared to be the only ones who sensed 
oncoming war.  Through his trials he warned of the thr at of fascism and used confessions and 
speeches in the courtroom to gain support for the Soviet Union, but for his audience the 
international situation was becoming too unstable to rely on a regime that used brutal methods of 
imprisonment, torture, and execution.  Western natio s had few good options at the time, and 
rather than collaborate with what appeared to many to be an unstable Communist dictator, they 
chose to allow Hitler to continue taking more territory and rearming his country.  In the end, 
Stalin was correct about the threat of war, but his methods of sending messages through staged 
trials failed to convince the world of its impending fate. 
                                                
2 Stephen Cohen’s work Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1974) 
explains that Bukharin constantly warned that Nazi Germany remained the largest threat to Soviet security and 
pushed for renewed attempts at cooperation with Great Britain.  He remarkably seemed to sense a shift in Soviet 
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